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Bargaining Inside the Black Box
ALLISON ORR LARSEN*
When jurors are presented with a menu of criminal verdict options and they
cannot reach a consensus among them, what should they do? Available evi-
dence suggests they are prone to compromise—that is, jurors will negotiate with
each other and settle on a verdict in the middle, often on a lesser-included
offense. The suggestion that jurors compromise is not new; it is supported by
empirical evidence, well-accepted by courts and commentators, and unsurpris-
ing given the pressure jurors feel to reach agreement and the different indi-
vidual views they likely hold. There are, however, some who say intrajury
negotiation represents a failure of the jury process. Conventional wisdom clings
to the notion that criminal verdicts reflect a jury’s unanimous factual assess-
ment. That notion is thwarted when a juror votes for a verdict as a compromise,
as a second choice to the one he thinks best reflects reality. To date, therefore,
compromise verdicts are typically dismissed as examples of maverick jurors
dishonoring their oath to apply the law and seek the truth.
This Article challenges that conventional wisdom by way of a new analogy. If
jurors each view the case differently and nonetheless negotiate with each other
to reach a deal, why is that wrong when 95% of criminal convictions are the
result of a similar process? I seek a new understanding of compromise verdicts
by making a novel comparison to plea bargaining. I argue that the former
should be understood in the context of the latter and that the best way to
evaluate intrajury negotiation is to juxtapose it with the negotiation that
dominates our criminal justice system. Instead of dismissing intrajury negotia-
tion as illegitimate, I argue that we should accept it as a reality and from there
seek to improve it with lessons drawn from plea negotiations.
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INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of criminal convictions are obtained by a negotiation and
deal.1 Scholars worry about the fairness of these plea bargains.2 They fret over
1. See William J. Stuntz, Of Seatbelts and Sentences, Supreme Court Justices and Spending
Patterns—Understanding the Unraveling of American Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 148
(2006) (“[T]he guilty plea rate stands at 95% and is still rising.”). Of course some pleas are not
preceded by any negotiation, but it is safe to say the vast majority of convictions result from some sort
of plea deal.
2. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2467–68 (2004); Sam W. Callan, An Experience in Justice Without Plea Negotiation, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 327, 328 (1979); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1909 (1992); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Comment, Honesty and Opacity in Charge
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (2003).
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who is doing the negotiating and under what circumstances, and some question
the very propriety of negotiating criminal convictions at all.3
Lurking behind many of these concerns is the belief that a verdict created by
negotiation and compromise is inherently inferior to a verdict rendered by a
jury. The idea is that a negotiated verdict, though practical, simply “contradicts
the fundamental purpose of the criminal trial, which is to establish the ‘material
truth.’”4 And although people generally agree that plea bargaining is here to
stay,5 most retain a reluctant resignation to it: a sense that negotiated justice is
simply at odds with the cornerstone of criminal law, the criminal trial.6
At least one form of bargaining, however, is not antithetical to the criminal
trial, but in fact takes place right at the heart of it. When criminal juries are
presented with a menu of verdict options and compromise among them to reach
a verdict in the middle, they engage in what I call “intrajury negotiation.”7 The
proposition that jurors compromise is supported by empirical evidence and
well-accepted by courts and commentators.8 It also should not be surprising;
3. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2 (“Most legal scholars oppose plea bargaining, finding it both
inefficient and unjust.”).
4. Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (2008) (quoting Michael Bohlander, Plea-Bargaining Before the ICTY, in
RICHARD MAY ET AL., ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD 159 (2001)).
5. Although there are some who call for the abolition of plea bargaining entirely, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2009 (1992) (“Plea bargaining is a
disaster. It can be, and should be, abolished.”), most critics now accept plea bargaining and focus on
improving specific aspects of the process, see, e.g., Bibas, supra note 2, at 2468–69; Wright & Miller,
supra note 2, at 1417.
6. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 295 (1996); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds?
Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 782 (1998); see also Dennis J. Devine
et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 622, 670–71 (2001) (noting that studies suggest that “allowing juries the opportunity to
convict the defendant on a lesser charge has a substantial impact on their verdicts”); Robert J.
MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 223, 230 (1990)
(“Several studies suggest that the availability of multiple response options can fundamentally alter the
jury’s decision.”). See discussion infra Part I for a detailed discussion of these jury studies.
8. See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as
Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 125–26 (discussing common critiques of compromise
verdicts); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 287 (2001)
(reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)) (“[E]xperiments confirm that
the compromise bias may affect verdicts.”); Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing:
Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 627–28 (2004) (“The ‘compromise’ and ‘decoy’
effects predict that when the jury is presented with more than one guilty option, the percentage of
defendants found not guilty of both offenses will be lower than the percentage of defendants found not
guilty when there is just one charge.”); Muller, supra note 7 (listing jury compromise as a possible
reason for inconsistent verdicts); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634–35 (1980) (suggesting
the potential for compromise verdicts as a reason for holding that a capital jury must be provided with
“a third option” to convict on a lesser-included offense); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 390
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to the “many compromise verdicts on lesser-included
offenses and lesser sentences” in the context of a debate over requiring unanimous juries).
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jurors, like any group decision maker, have strong incentives to reach consen-
sus, and negotiation is a natural and efficient way to do so when multiple
options are available and time is limited. A negotiated verdict, therefore, arises
not only from the cases that plead out but also from many of the approximately
150,000 jury trials that take place in the United States every year.9
Negotiation, however, is not a task typically associated with jurors. Conven-
tional wisdom clings to the Twelve Angry Men vision of jury decision making.10
Verdicts should result from a quest to discern truth.11 Either a defendant is
guilty or he is not; either a prosecutor can prove his case or he cannot.
Indeed, terminology reflects this notion: jury discussions are called “delibera-
tions,” not “negotiations.” Although the concepts are related, there is an impor-
tant distinction: whether multiple minds are looking for factual consensus or
just an acceptable middle ground. In the traditional vision, twelve strangers
discuss evidence until they are all convinced of the same story. We call this a
deliberation. On the other end of the spectrum is a deal unconcerned with
factual agreement. When a defense attorney and prosecutor negotiate a plea, for
example, they are not typically attempting to convince each other of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence.12 A whole host of considerations come into
play—the defendant’s character, his criminal record, the consequences he will
likely face—aside from the story of the crime. That is why most call this
conversation a plea negotiation, not a plea deliberation. A deliberation becomes
a negotiation when a result is reached without regard for the participants’
subjective views on the facts.
Even though we do not refer to jury discussions as negotiations, many of
them turn into just that. The truth, as jury scholars have demonstrated, is that
“[j]uries are notoriously prone to compromises”13: factions on a jury will split
their differences to “achieve[] unanimous support for some negotiated mix of
convictions and acquittals.”14 This means that many criminal verdicts do not
result from a jury’s unanimous factual assessment, but will instead reflect a
negotiated settlement.
9. See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 7
(2007), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/pdf/SOSCompendiumFinal.pdf.
10. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (2003) (reviewing
REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN (1955)) (“The jury in Twelve Angry Men is the embodiment of this
ideal, the jury at its finest.”).
11. See id. at 1391.
12. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1282–83 (1975); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189,
193–97 (2002). But see Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We
Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2003).
13. Farber, supra note 8 (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)).
14. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 7.
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To date, compromise verdicts are generally dismissed as flaws in the jury
process—examples of maverick jurors dishonoring their oath to uphold the law
and reasons why the jury should not be trusted with more power, for example,
to participate in sentencing decisions.15
Is this reaction justified? If jurors each view the case differently and nonethe-
less negotiate with each other to reach a compromise, why is that unquestion-
ably wrong when 95% of criminal convictions are the result of a similar
process?
This Article seeks a new understanding of compromise verdicts by making a
novel comparison to plea bargaining. I argue that the former should be under-
stood in the context of the latter, and that the best way to evaluate intrajury
negotiation is to juxtapose it with the negotiation that dominates our criminal
justice system and has already been subject to detailed study.
Drawing this comparison leads to several observations that I will place in two
broad categories. First, I will discuss the similarities between intrajury and plea
negotiations. The analogy is closer than one might suspect. Both types of deals
are secret and not reviewed, the negotiating actors are all highly motivated to
make a deal, and both types of deals are also afflicted with many of the same
bargaining pitfalls. Plea-bargaining scholars, for example, have pointed out that
the way a prosecutor “frames” a plea in negotiations—comparing it to other
(perhaps severe) options—can distort the defendant’s choice.16 I will argue that
the same could be said of a jury trial where prosecutors, no doubt mindful of the
likelihood of verdict negotiation among jurors, overcharge in anticipation of a
compromise and thereby determine the boundaries and influence the result of
the jury’s negotiation.
Second, I will distinguish intrajury and plea negotiations. Certainly plea
negotiations and intrajury negotiations are different in significant ways. The
negotiators themselves are different, and they negotiate under very different
conditions. These differences are important, and our evaluation of intrajury
negotiation is enhanced by the comparison. Sentence forecasts, for example,
play an important role in plea negotiations, but jurors are generally not respon-
15. See, e.g., id. at 784 (“By reaching a compromise verdict, the jury dishonors the reasonable doubt
standard, because each faction on the jury surrenders its honestly held beliefs on the question of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. To be sure, compromise verdicts are undoubtedly quite common, and they
help to resolve cases, avoid retrials, and clear crowded dockets. But useful as they may be, compromise
verdicts are lawless verdicts.”); Ashlee Smith, Comment, Vice–A–Verdict: Legally Inconsistent Jury
Verdicts Should Not Stand in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 403 (2006) (“Compromise verdicts
are perhaps the most troubling means of reaching an inconsistent verdict, as they constitute a willful
and conscious disregard of the court’s instructions.”). Compromise verdicts are also used as part of the
debate over jury sentencing reforms. See Cahill, supra note 8, at 124–26; Morris B. Hoffman, The Case
for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 989–90 (2003); Chris Kemmitt, Function Over Form: Reviving
the Criminal Jury’s Historical Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 112 (2006);
Lillquist, supra note 8, at 662.
16. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2514–17; Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 864–66
(1995).
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sible for determining sentences, and hence engage in verdict negotiation some-
what in the dark, or at least with less information than do prosecutors and
defense attorneys.17 If criminal verdicts are going to be negotiated in one form
or another—either by jurors or by their professional counterparts—perhaps we
should provide all negotiators with some of this valuable information.
Ultimately, I conclude that while steps can and should be taken to improve
intrajury negotiation, the common critiques of compromise verdicts—that they
are lawless flaws in the jury system—do not have the force they might have in a
world without plea bargaining. I assume in this Article that juries are valuable:
our system is enhanced by committing legal decisions to the hands of ordinary
people who have common sense, who are sensitive to context, and who can
provide a check on overbroad criminal law.18 These assets of the jury are not
lost just because a juror negotiates with his colleagues to find an acceptable
result rather than deliberating until reaching a factual consensus. Negotiation is
now a staple of American criminal law,19 and in the context of plea bargaining,
it is an aspect of criminal adjudication that has been thoroughly examined.20
Instead of quickly dismissing intrajury negotiation as an illegitimate process, I
argue we should recognize it as a reality and seek to improve it with lessons we
have learned from plea negotiations.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents empirical studies on jury
behavior that demonstrate the likelihood of intrajury negotiation and compro-
mise verdicts. Parts II and III then analyze intrajury negotiation by comparing
the practice to plea bargaining. Part II connects the two processes and discusses
what can be learned from the similarities; Part III tackles how plea negotiation
and intrajury negotiation are different and explores how those differences
inform whether we think intrajury negotiation is legitimate. Finally, Part IV
discusses the normative implications and payoffs of my analogy. I argue that
when intrajury negotiations and plea negotiations are placed side by side, many
common criticisms of compromise verdicts are undermined and possible re-
forms to intrajury negotiation are brought to light.
I. HOW DO WE KNOW JURORS NEGOTIATE?
Perhaps the defining feature of a jury’s deliberation is that it takes place in
secret: a set of strangers are charged with assigning criminal liability to an
individual, are told that they can keep their discussions private, and are not
required to provide reasons for their final judgment.21 Courts are adamant about
17. Cahill, supra note 8, at 108–09 (making this observation and arguing that the jury should not be
blind to the consequences of its conviction).
18. For a discussion on the values of a jury generally, see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966).
19. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1912 (“[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”).
20. See sources cited supra note 2.
21. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 3; MacCoun, supra note 7, at 223.
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protecting the mystery and secrecy of “the black box”; jury discussions are
among the most private and privileged in our legal system.22 Consequently, it is
impossible to know what exactly takes place in a jury room.
There are a few observations, however, which seem certain. First, we know it
is common for criminal jurors to have a menu of options in front of them.
Developed at common law and inherited from England, the lesser-included
offense doctrine provides that “a criminal defendant may be convicted at trial of
any crime supported by the evidence which is less than, but included within, the
offense charged by the prosecution.”23 Thanks to this doctrine, a criminal jury is
not always given a binary choice (guilty or not guilty); instead, more and more
frequently, juries are presented with a charge sheet that lists a variety of verdict
options in varying degrees of seriousness.24
A debate exists about whether these options favor the prosecution or the
defendant. On the one hand, some suggest that these instructions are pro-
prosecutor because they increase the chances that the defendant will be con-
victed of something. Justice Thurgood Marshall subscribed to this view: he
explained that “[t]he very fact that a defendant has been arrested, charged, and
brought to trial on several charges may suggest to the jury that he must be guilty
of at least one of those crimes.”25
On the other hand, some say it is the defendant who benefits from these
instructions because they can lead to a compromise that reflects a jury’s
mercy.26 Those who adopt this view (articulated by Justice Brennan) believe
that if a jury retains a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt but still has a
feeling he did something wrong, there is a “substantial risk” the jury will not
return a verdict of acquittal as it should.27 On this theory, the defendant is better
off if jurors are not forced to make an all-or-nothing choice between, for
22. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (“[T]he deliberations of the jury shall
remain private and secret . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s note (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“The jury as we know it is supposed to reach its decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy;
objections to the secrecy of jury deliberations are nothing less than objections to the jury system
itself.”).
23. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the
Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6
(1995).
24. There are many familiar examples of “lesser includeds” (as they are sometimes called). The
obvious one is second-degree murder, a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder with the same
elements as the more serious charge, minus premeditation and deliberation. Other common examples
include possession of a controlled substance (a lesser-included offense of distribution of the substance),
criminal trespass (a lesser-included offense of burglary), and driving to endanger a life (a lesser-
included offense of vehicular homicide).
25. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires the submission of lesser-included
offense instructions to a jury when the death penalty is an option. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
627 (1980); see also Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 251–52 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1973).
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example, first-degree murder and setting the defendant free.28
In any event, jury instructions on lesser-included offenses are common
nowadays.29 Either party can request them, and more often than not, it is the
defendant who does so.30 The instructions are available in federal court and in
all fifty states, and almost all courts agree there is very rarely a justification for
not giving such instructions to the jury if they are requested by a party and
supported by sufficient evidence.31
The second relevant and certain observation is that those on the “front lines”
of criminal litigation—judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys—are keenly
aware that juries compromise.32 Regardless of whether they think it appropriate
or not, most attorneys agree that “[j]urors arguing and coming to some sort of
compromise is just part of the system.”33
28. Indeed, the vast majority of objections to lesser-included offense instructions come from the
prosecution side, which suggests that at least prosecutors see validity to this theory. See Ram Orzach &
Stephen J. Spurr, Lesser-Included Offenses, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239–40 & n.3 (2008).
29. By 1980, when the Supreme Court took up its seminal case on lesser includeds, Beck v.
Alabama, it had “long been ‘beyond dispute [in federal courts] that the defendant is entitled to an
instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit [it],’” and, even at that time, every
state court to address the issue concurred. 447 U.S. at 635 (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 208).
30. Orzach & Spurr, supra note 28. Only North Carolina, Tennessee, and Oklahoma require that a
jury be instructed on lesser-included offenses (meaning that the court must issue these instructions sua
sponte); in the vast majority of jurisdictions, one of the parties must request it, and the trial judge
retains discretion whether to issue it. See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7, at 305 n.26.
31. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 515 (3d ed. 2004); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Future of Constitutionally Required Lesser Included
Offenses, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 590–91 (2006) (collecting state cases); Orzach & Spurr, supra note
28, at 243 (“Is there any justification for denying the defendant a jury instruction on a lesser-included
offense? Almost all courts and commentators say no . . . .”). The standards for submitting the instruc-
tions are generally permissive. So, for example, it is reversible error not to instruct on a less serious
offense when a genuine dispute of fact exists about a state of mind that distinguishes one crime from
another. And most courts agree that the instruction should be given if there is any evidence of a factual
circumstance (say, self-defense or provocation) that would justify conviction on the lesser charge.
Hoffheimer, supra, at 591; see also Tucker v. United States, 871 A.2d 453, 461 (D.C. 2005) (“Any
evidence, however weak, is sufficient to support a lesser-included instruction so long as a jury could
rationally convict . . . after crediting the evidence.” (quoting Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254,
261 (D.C. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Louisy v. State, 667 So. 2d 972, 974 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (“Even if the weight of the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the state’s charge,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense as to which there is any evidence.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Kolaric v. State, 616 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); State v. Givens, 917 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (“The trial court
should resolve all doubts upon the evidence in favor of instructing on the lower degree of the crime,
leaving it to the jury to decide of which of the two offenses, if any, the defendant is guilty.” (citing State
v. Warrington, 884 S.W.2d 711, 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994))).
32. See Hoffheimer, supra note 31, at 594.
33. John F. Hagan, Legal Experts Criticize Jurors Who Compromised, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Aug. 23, 1997, at 8-A (quoting Case Western Reverse University Law Professor Paul Giannelli)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For other newspaper reports presenting attorney and judge views on
compromise verdicts, see Eddy McNeil, Penn Judge Lets Jurors Consider 2 More Charges, EVENING
TRIBUNE (San Diego), June 4, 1987, at B-1 (“What happens when nobody gets up and argues a
lesser-included offense is that it’s just sitting out there for a compromise . . . .” (quoting defense
attorney Milton Silverman) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jason Riley, State Law Leaves Jurors
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This impression is shared by the judiciary as well. As one judge explained,
“[t]he jury, if it cannot agree on the basic issue of guilt, may seek the course of
least resistance in the jury room and unjustly convict on the lesser offense
instead of forthrightly acquitting.”34 The judicial concern works the other way
too: “[A]lthough the defendant is in fact guilty of the greater offense, [the jury]
may take the easier course by exercising its mercy-dispensing power and return
a guilty verdict on the lesser offense, thereby shirking its sworn duty.”35
We know, therefore, that juries are frequently presented with a menu of
verdict options, and that—at least in the eyes of the judges who issue lesser-
included offense instructions and the litigants who request or object to them—
the threat of a compromise among them is very real indeed. We do not know,
however, what exactly goes on in the jury room to produce those deals.
Fortunately, modern jury scholars have developed techniques that enable us
to come close. Recordings of actual jury deliberation are rare (and are met with
strong resistance), but the last fifty years have brought new enthusiasm and new
methodologies to the study of jury decision making.36 In the discussion that
follows, I discuss two varieties of jury studies: (1) post-trial interviews of real
jurors, and (2) results of mock jury simulations. Together, they reveal that when
a jury is given multiple verdict options (more than just acquit or convict on one
charge), it is “prone to pick the compromise judgment, even if that judgment
would attract little support in a two-option set.”37
A. JURY SURVEY DATA
One method of studying jury deliberation is through post-trial interviews with
jurors.38 Several years ago the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) con-
ducted a large project of this nature. With the goal of identifying factors that
lead to hung juries, the NCSC gathered data from approximately 3500 jurors
Puzzled, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (“[O]ur juries are guessing at the proper
results, or more often, convicting of a lesser-included offense, sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly
simply as a compromise to confusion . . . .” (quoting Justice Will Scott) (internal quotations marks
omitted)).
34. United States v. Waldron, 9 M.J. 811, 816 (N.C.M.R. 1980) (construing FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c)).
35. Id. (citing Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 n.6 (1965)).
36. Scientific study of jury decision making can be traced to 1953 and the Chicago Jury Project, a
multiyear, multiscientist endeavor from the University of Chicago with the then-novel objective of
using social science methods to study legal phenomena. As part of that project, researchers secretly
recorded the deliberations of several federal juries. This effort resulted in a public outcry, a congressio-
nal inquiry, and subsequent legislation prohibiting the practice. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil
Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1867–68 (2001).
37. Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7, at 306.
38. Each method of studying jury decision making comes with its own strengths and weaknesses.
The advantage to jury survey data is that it comes from real jurors as opposed to participants in a study;
the weakness is that these jurors can be unreliable indicators of how exactly a jury decision is made.
Faulty recollection, hindsight, and other biases can color the way a jury recounts the deliberation. See
Shari Seidman Diamond, Essay, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 717, 727 (2006).
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who sat in felony trials in four large urban areas.39 It recorded the final verdict
for each jury (acquittal, conviction, or deadlock) and then asked the individual
jurors, once their trial had concluded, “to report on their individual opinions,
verdict preferences, and the dynamics of deliberations.”40 Several NCSC discov-
eries bear on the present discussion.
First, the study concluded that jury deliberation does in fact make a differ-
ence in the final verdict.41 This was an important finding because a different and
common perception—attributed to jury scholar pioneers Harry Kalven, Jr. and
Hans Zeisel—is that jury deliberation does not really matter; jurors make up
their minds during the trial, and although deliberation “brings out the pic-
ture, . . . the outcome is pre-determined.”42 This theory was not born out by the
hung jury project data. The majority of jurors interviewed—62%—reported that
they changed their mind at least once during the trial. And almost half of those
jurors—24%—said that their mind was changed during deliberation.43 This led
Valerie Hans and Nicole Waters, among the authors of the NCSC study, to
conclude that “deliberations play a vital role in generating juror consensus.”44
The NCSC study also asked the jurors about their individual opinions: “If it
were entirely up to you as a one-person jury, what would your verdict have been
in this case?”45 The researchers were then able to compare those answers to the
actual verdicts returned and thus identify dissenting jurors—both those who
held out and those who ultimately conformed.46
The results were surprising. Although it somewhat varied by jurisdiction, the
average hung jury rate for the thirty jurisdictions studied by the project was only
6.2%.47 In other words, slightly more than six out of every hundred juries
reached a deadlock and could not agree on a verdict. But, even though relatively
few juries hang, a remarkably high number—54%—of the jury verdicts were
rendered with at least one juror whose “one-person” verdict diverged from the
final verdict.48 This means “a sizable proportion of jurors eventually voted in
line with the group but at odds with their personal preferences.”49
39. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?, 2–3, 33 tbl.3.1 (2002), http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf.
40. Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One: Opinion Formation, Conformity, and Dissent
on Juries, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 513, 514 (2009), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
lsrp_papers/114/.
41. HANNAFORD-AGOR, HANS, MOTT & MUNSTERMAN, supra note 39, at 73 (“[T]he process of jury
deliberation is a critically important factor in the ultimate outcome of the trial.”).
42. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 489.
43. Waters & Hans, supra note 40, at 522.
44. Id. at 539.
45. Id. at 520.
46. Id. at 516.
47. HANNAFORD-AGOR, HANS, MOTT & MUNSTERMAN, supra note 39, at 25.
48. Waters & Hans, supra note 40, at 523.
49. Id. at 537.
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Why would a person vote for a verdict when it does not reflect what he thinks
is the “best” or “right” outcome? Of course one possibility is that jurors do not
care about getting it right in the first place and so they change their votes on a
whim. But assuming, as I do, that jurors generally take their civic duty seri-
ously, perhaps the divergence between group outcomes and individual prefer-
ences simply means that a deal was made that was “right enough” for everyone
to accept. This possibility is hardly remote. Indeed, studies on group decision
making reveal how prone jurors are to compromise.
B. MOCK JURY SIMULATIONS
In a mock jury experiment, participants witness a simulated trial under
various conditions and are asked to render a judgment.50 This field of study is
vast indeed, and I will focus on only a few studies: (1) those that test an
individual’s inclination to compromise in legal decision making, and (2) those
that show what happens when multiple verdict alternatives are given to a
deliberating group.
1. Effect of Multiple Options on an Individual’s Legal Decision Making
Social scientists tell us that the framing of a choice matters; that is, a person’s
decision-making behavior is altered by the presence or absence of additional
options. A savvy salesperson knows, for example, that a customer can be
induced to buy an intermediately expensive camera when he is first shown a
bare-bones one and then an expensive alternative.51 This effect has been named
“the compromise effect” by behavioral scientists, and it applies beyond market-
ing studies to the context of juror decision making.
One of the more well-known empirical studies on this topic was conducted in
the mid-nineties by Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky.52
Kelman and his colleagues enlisted randomly selected mock jurors to read and
evaluate case summaries.53 One case involved a defendant who purposely shot
and killed a security guard after an altercation in which the guard falsely
50. Of course, simulated experiments suffer from the limitation that participants know their verdict
is fictitious and without real-world consequences. This limitation on mock jury simulation is well
recognized. See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 8, at 662–63 (acknowledging the artificiality of mock jury
scenarios). But several studies suggest that mock jurors and real jurors do not reach decisions in
dramatically different ways, and jury simulations have the added benefit of allowing scientists to
manipulate conditions and focus on specific variables of interest. See E. Allan Lind & Laurens Walker,
Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Research on Legal Issues, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
5, 6 (1979); MacCoun, supra note 7, at 224 (citing Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological
Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
287 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982)); see also REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY
PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (offering a detailed analysis of jury simulations).
51. Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7, at 287–88 (citing Itamar Simonson & Amos
Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281,
282 (1992)).
52. Id. at 287.
53. Id. at 289.
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accused the defendant of burglary and used a racial epithet. The subjects were
all informed that the possible verdicts were special circumstances murder (the
most serious offense), murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary man-
slaughter.54 They were also told that involuntary manslaughter was appropriate
only if the defendant reasonably believed he was defending himself and that
special circumstances murder was appropriate only if the guard was acting in
the line of duty.55
The subjects were then divided into two groups. Group one was told that the
judge had determined the guard was not on duty, taking special circumstances
murder off the table. Group two was told that there was no evidence the
defendant subjectively believed he was defending himself, taking involuntary
manslaughter off the table. Kelman called the first group the “lower set” and the
second group the “upper set” because the three available verdict options were
collectively less serious in the first group and collectively more serious in the
second.56
The results showed a compromise effect much like the one demonstrated by
the camera salesperson hypothetical. In the lower set (in which jurors chose
between involuntary manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, and murder), 55%
chose voluntary manslaughter, the middle choice, and 39% chose murder, the
highest charge. In the second group, the upper set (in which jurors chose
between murder with special circumstances, murder, and voluntary manslaugh-
ter), only 31% of subjects chose voluntary manslaughter, and 57% chose
murder, the middle choice.57
Thus, Kelman concluded, “[a verdict] option does better by being intermedi-
ate in the choice set presented.”58 This was true even though the jurors should
have evaluated whether the defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter
independent from the question of whether the security guard was on duty.
Indeed, Kelman chose this particular fact pattern precisely because the jurors
were told that the difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter
depended only on whether they thought the defendant was adequately pro-
voked; it had nothing to do with the guard’s on-duty status.59 Despite its
irrelevance, however, the presence or absence of the higher charge affected how
jurors saw the case, confirming the tendency for compromise among verdict
alternatives.60
54. Id. at 292. The point of informing all participants of all four options was to control for the
possibility that the differences across groups could be explained by additional information signaled by
the additional options. Id. at 294.
55. Id. at 292–93.
56. Id. at 293–94.
57. Id. at 294.
58. Id. at 295.
59. Id. at 293.
60. Kelman’s study was not the first or the last empirical look into the compromise effect on legal
decision making. His results have been replicated by many other social scientists in several different
contexts, and his work is often cited by legal scholars. See, e.g., MacCoun, supra note 7, at 224; Neil
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2. The Effect of Multiple Verdict Options on Group Deliberation
A second type of relevant research involves the dynamics of the deliberation
process. These studies test not just an individual juror’s decision making when
multiple verdict options are present but also what happens when a set of these
individuals are collectively charged with making the decision.
One recent study examined the “third verdict” option under Scottish law.61
For over three hundred years, Scottish jurors have been given three possible
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, or “not proven.”62 The “not proven” verdict “has the
same legal effect as a [n]ot [g]uilty verdict” (meaning the accused cannot be
retried); it is reserved for situations in which there is reasonable doubt about a
person’s guilt but there is still a sense the defendant did something wrong.63
Critics claim that the third verdict may be viewed by jurors as a compromise
when the evidence is not sufficiently compelling, thus artificially decreasing the
number of guilty verdicts that would result in a traditional binary system.64
Psychologist Lorraine Hope and several of her colleagues empirically tested
this hypothesis, specifically noting the parallels with the common American
practice of including charges on lesser-included offenses.65 They recruited
about 150 jury-eligible community participants and placed them in small groups
(four to eight members per set). The groups were randomly assigned to one of
six experimental conditions: half were given two verdict options, half were
given three verdict options (including “not proven”), and the conditions were
further varied on the basis of strength of evidence of guilt (weak, moderate, or
Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 214–16 (1972); see also J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving
Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 329 & n.147
(citing Kelman and Vidmar to show that “[m]ock juries presented with the option of convicting on a
lesser-included offense quite frequently take that option, generating a ‘compromise effect’”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1065 & n.70 (2009) (citing Kelman as evidence that
“jurors themselves have been found to trim, in the sense that they steer between the extremes; for this
reason, the prosecutor’s selection of criminal counts can greatly influence what the jury ends up
doing”).
One area of the law in which this “compromise effect” has been well tested is in the controversial
area of insanity verdicts. Critics say that giving a jury an additional option in cases in which the
defendant’s mental state is in question—an option sometimes called “diminished responsibility,”
“diminished capacity,” or “guilty but mentally ill”—causes compromised and inconsistent verdicts. See
generally Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Verdict Schemas, 15 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 533 (1991); Bart R. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed of the Consequences of the Insanity
Verdict?, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 167 (1980).
61. See Lorraine Hope, Edith Greene, Amina Memon, Melanie Gavisk & Kate Houston, A Third
Verdict Option: Exploring the Impact of the Not Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision Making, 32
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241 (2008); see also Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third
Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1304–05 (2005) (proposing the introduction of a third verdict option
in American law).
62. Hope, Greene, Memon, Gavisk & Houston, supra note 61, at 242.
63. Id. at 241–42.
64. See id. at 243.
65. Id.
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strong).66 After reading a case study of a fictitious murder trial, the mock jurors
were told to deliberate for at least twenty minutes. They were told that they
should aim for a unanimous verdict, but to record the verdict of the majority of
group members if unanimity was impossible.67
The results indicated that the availability of the third option significantly
affected the decisions reached by the jurors. Seventy-six percent of juries given
three verdict options reached the “not proven” verdict; only 5% in that set
returned a not guilty verdict.68 This differed significantly from the 65% of juries
that returned a not guilty option when given only two options.69 Interestingly,
however, the effect of the third option was much weaker when the evidence of
guilt was clear cut one way or the other; it was only in the close cases (when the
strength of evidence was “moderate”) that the availability of the third verdict
made a real difference.70
Hope’s experiment demonstrates that the compromise effect—illustrated above
in Kelman’s experiments on individuals—applies to group decision making. But
even more interesting for present purposes are the experiments that delve into
what actually happens in these group deliberations to explain the compromise.
At the outset, it should be noted that deliberation of any sort has been shown
“to make group members more extreme in their views than they were before
they started to talk.”71 In Cass Sunstein’s principal article on the subject, groups
from Colorado met to discuss hot button political issues.72 The major effect of
the discussion, the researchers found, was to make liberal-minded people more
liberal and conservative-minded people more conservative.73 Even when the
subjects reported their postdeliberation opinions anonymously, their views were
more extreme after deliberation than they were before discussion began.74
66. Id. at 247.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 248.
69. Id.
70. Id. Other research supports Hope’s observation that the strength of evidence in a case affects
whether a jury will compromise. See Devine et al., supra note 7 (summarizing relevant empirical work
and concluding that “[j]uries thus appear fairly responsive to verdict options, but the impact of verdict
options is likely to interact with the strength of evidence against the defendant”). Additionally, in their
famous book, The American Jury, Kalven and Zeisel theorize that when the evidence presented at trial
clearly favors one side, juries will choose the corresponding verdict, but when the evidence is
somewhat ambiguous, jurors are “liberated” from the constraints of the evidence and become influ-
enced by other factors. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 164–66; see also Dennis J. Devine, Jennifer
Buddenbaum, Stephanie Houp, Nathan Studebaker & Dennis P. Stolle, Strength of Evidence, Extraevi-
dentiary Influence, and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136,
136–148 (2009) (using post-trial questionnaire data collected from judges, attorneys, and jurors to
support the liberation hypothesis).
71. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 915 (2007); see also MacCoun, supra note 7, at 228.
72. Schkade, Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 71, at 916–17.
73. Id. at 917.
74. Id.
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Sunstein focused on political discussions among strangers, but he points to
evidence of group polarization in jury studies as well.75
This leads to a potential contradiction: if deliberating jury members polarize
in their individual views after discussion, what explains the seemingly inconsis-
tent phenomenon of compromise verdicts? To answer this question, we need
more information on the dynamics of deliberation.
One of the most comprehensive and well-regarded empirical studies of
deliberation dynamics was conducted by Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and
Nancy Pennington, and published in their book, Inside the Jury.76 Hastie and
colleagues made their jury simulation experiments as realistic as possible: they
recruited mock jurors from Superior Court jury pools in Massachusetts, they
conducted a voir dire excluding those who may have had a pre-existing bias,
and they hired professional actors and attorneys to re-enact a murder trial live in
front of the participants.77
The jurors were given four verdict options: first-degree murder, second-
degree murder, manslaughter, and not guilty.78 Some of Hastie’s mock jurors
were instructed that their decision must be unanimous, and others were given a
majority-rule condition.79 All filled out a predeliberation questionnaire in which
they were asked what they would choose if they had to decide the case on their
own.80 The mock jurors were videotaped and observed during their delibera-
tions.81
Several of Hastie’s observations are relevant for the present discussion. First,
he observed that the favorite predeliberation verdict of the jurors was manslaugh-
ter, but after deliberation there was a shift to the middle, making second-degree
murder the most popular verdict choice.82 He also noticed that although over
20% of mock jurors in all conditions preferred a first-degree murder verdict
before deliberation, the only groups to return such a verdict were those that
could decide the case by majority rule.83 None of the groups forced to reach a
unanimous decision returned a guilty verdict on the most serious charge.84
75. Id. at 927 & n.40 (citing David G. Myers & Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in
Simulated Juries, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63 (1976)). Sunstein and colleagues refer to a
study by Martin Kaplan and David Myers, social scientists who were interested in group polarization
among jurors in the 1970s. Myers & Kaplan, supra, at 63–64. Myers and Kaplan divided mock jurors
into groups and assigned each one a traffic case to read and evaluate. They found that “group
discussion . . . significantly enhanced the dominant initial leanings of the group members.” Id. at 65.
For a resource collecting several of the “hundreds of . . . small group studies” documenting group
polarization, see MacCoun, supra note 7, at 228.
76. HASTIE, PENROD, & PENNINGTON, supra note 50.
77. Id. at 45–47.
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 59.
83. Id. at 60 tbl.4.1.
84. Id.
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Certainly, as Hastie noted, this shift to the middle could simply indicate that
second-degree murder was the more accurate verdict.85 But Hastie thought
instead that “the shift can be best understood as the natural resolution of social
forces in the jury.”86 The social forces to which Hastie alludes are the develop-
ment and movement of factions within the jury, which he called “the most
visible” and “most important” of all deliberation dynamic events.87 Hastie
defined factions based on common verdict preferences among the participants.
The initial verdict preferences were based on the jurors’ predeliberation question-
naires; scientists then tracked how these preferences shifted during group
discussion.88
Hastie noticed a dramatic difference in faction movement depending on
whether a unanimous verdict was required.89 Jurors in a unanimous “jurisdic-
tion” who initially voted for the extreme verdict options of first-degree murder
or not guilty were “much likelier” to change their voting preferences by the end
of deliberation.90 And, in turn, jurors in these voting factions in the majority-
rule conditions were much more likely to hold out.91 This dynamic was “almost
universal”—only one juror in the unanimous-decision-rule group failed to
defect, but over 50% of those in favor of acquittal in the majority rule condition
held out.92
Hastie also observed several other factors that influenced faction movement.
The size of the faction mattered greatly.93 Jurors were far less likely to change
their votes if they belonged to a larger faction, and jurors were more likely to
defect from a small faction, especially when their votes were required for
unanimity.94 In addition, postdeliberation questionnaires revealed that those
jurors who were in the minority factions were “motivated to shift to the largest
faction” when their votes would “put the jury over-the-top of the quorum
requirement” or when it meant they could “avoid finishing as dissenters” in a
majority jurisdiction.95
It seems therefore that both the internal drive to compromise (illustrated by
the Kelman study and the camera-salesman hypothetical) and the external
pressure to reach a collective decision (illustrated in Hastie’s research) combine
to produce compromise jury verdicts. In fact, the above research suggests a
hypothesis for how this works: people form factions that track their verdict
85. Id. at 59.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 100.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 102.
93. Hastie and his colleagues observed that the size of the faction was, in fact, the “most important
determinant of the outcome of deliberation.” Id. at 106.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 119.
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preferences, polarize after group discussion, and then negotiate with each other
to ultimately compromise in the middle.
To be sure, jurors will not negotiate in every case. But in the close cases—
which, after all, amount to a large set of the cases that go to trial—the empirical
evidence strongly suggests that jurors compromise when given verdict alterna-
tives.96 At the very least, the threat of a compromise is real enough to make
judges cautious,97 to cause prosecutors to object to the inclusion of lesser
includeds,98 and to even warrant the constitutionalization of lesser-included
options for death penalty cases.99 This dynamic was even articulated by Chief
Justice Burger thirty years ago. “Courts,” the Chief Justice wrote, “have long
held that in the practical business of deciding cases the factfinders, not unlike
negotiators, are permitted the luxury of verdicts reached by compromise.”100
II. AN ANALOGY TO PLEA BARGAINING
Although the reality of juror negotiation is well recognized, the question of
whether it is a legitimate practice remains controversial. A juror’s job is simply
to decide facts, the argument goes, and he has no place compromising his
factual assessment in order to reach consensus on a verdict alternative.101
Before rushing to judgment, however, it is worth remembering that negotia-
tion among verdict options is not a process wholly foreign to criminal law. Plea
bargains are struck by criminal defendants all the time.102 And although the
96. See sources cited supra note 70.
97. See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7, at 309 n.32 (“Currently, when judges
instruct jurors to consider lesser included offenses, they indeed make some efforts to ‘separate’
decisions to try to [e]nsure that jurors do not look at their actual menu of choices as an option set.”); see
also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867–68 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(expressing concern that a defendant could be prejudiced if a jury attempts to reach a compromise
verdict when required to consider multiple counts); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 390 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to “many compromise verdicts on lesser-included offenses” as an
argument for requiring a unanimous jury).
98. See Kelman, supra note 7, at 305 (“‘Compromise’ effects are well known to both district at-
torneys and defenders . . . .”); Orzach & Spurr, supra note 28, at 239–45 (noting the common tendency
for prosecutors to object to the inclusion of lesser-included offenses based on a concern that the jury
will arrive at a compromise verdict).
99. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645–46 (1980).
100. Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 168 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
101. For an example of such criticism, see generally Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and
Accountability in the Litigation Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15 (1990).
Brodin argues against a general verdict and in favor of a jury fact verdict—much like the findings of
fact that a judge returns when she sits as fact-finder. As part of his argument, Brodin observes that
“deliberations may sometimes resemble ‘horse trading’ among the jurors resulting in a compromise
verdict.” Id. at 43; see also Kemmitt, supra note 15 (noting the traditional idea that “the jury exists
merely to find facts”).
102. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“One
statistic dominates any realistic discussion of criminal justice in America today: roughly ninety percent
of the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal courts plead guilty rather than exercise their
right to stand trial before a court or jury.”).
Although the basic practice is certainly familiar, there are actually several specific aspects of plea
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process has its critics, few still question the legitimacy of plea negotiations
generally.103 Considering intrajury negotiation as a cousin to plea bargaining,
therefore, might change the way we feel about it and (even better) reveal ways
to improve it. Four aspects of the analogy are discussed below: (a) similar
deal-making methods, (b) similar drives to compromise, (c) similar bargaining
pitfalls, and (d) similar practical realities.
A. SIMILAR DEAL-MAKING METHODS
The first and most obvious similarity is that intrajury negotiation and plea
negotiation are both confidential enterprises: they both take place in secret, they
both are largely unreviewable, and they both are hard to monitor by policymak-
ers. Indeed, the secrecy of plea bargaining and its inability to be regulated are
two hallmarks of the practice.104 Plea-bargaining practices are so elusive that
even the Department of Justice finds them hard to control.105 In fact, Rachel
Barkow recently observed that “there are currently no effective legal checks in
bargaining that have acquired their own names and definitions. Understanding these nuances will aid in
the discussion that follows. “Sentence bargaining,” for instance, involves a guilty plea in exchange for
expected leniency at sentencing. See Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a
World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 302 (2005) (calling for judicial oversight of
sentence bargaining). “Fact bargaining” is the more controversial practice of stipulating to certain facts
(for example, a specific amount of narcotics) in order to secure a more forgiving charge or sentence. See
Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 303, 323 (2009). And—most relevant for present discussions—“charge bargaining” describes
what happens when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange not only for the chance at a more lenient
sentence but also to face a less serious charge altogether. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice:
Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1260–64 (2008); Ronald
F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 9
(2007).
103. But see Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 2009 (arguing for the abolition of plea bargaining).
104. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of
Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1935, 1936 (2006) (“[F]or the most part, prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining
is unreviewable . . . .”); Wright & Miller, supra note 2.
105. The Department of Justice’s formal policy is to prohibit fact bargaining and charge bargaining
altogether. See Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspec-
tives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1077 (2006)
(citing the Ashcroft Memo prohibiting fact bargaining and charge bargaining by federal prosecutors);
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1288
(1997) (noting that “the federal guidelines system includes a unique package of rules and practices
intended to address the problem of prosecutorial discretion” (footnote omitted)). Despite this ban,
however, observers claim that prosecutors continue to use fact bargaining and charge bargaining as
important tools in their arsenal. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for
Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 165, 193 (observing there
are reasons to believe “the Justice Department cannot meaningfully restrain local United States
Attorney’s Offices from adopting locally convenient plea bargaining practices”); Schulhofer & Nagel,
supra, at 1311–12 (finding examples of evading the Guidelines through bargaining); Simons, supra
note 102; see also United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284–85 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating
that those who deny the “sweeping . . . plea bargaining culture today” are “sophists”).
1584 [Vol. 99:1567THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
place to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their discretion.”106
For better or for worse, the same observation can be made about jurors who
negotiate. Compromise verdicts have been recognized for some time.107 Courts
are aware that jurors negotiate, and many judges condemn compromise verdicts
as the work product of a jury that has abandoned its proper role.108 But the
common judicial sentiment also seems to be that there is little that can be done
about this. Indeed, the Supreme Court observed over fifty years ago that
“[c]ourts uniformly disapprove compromise verdicts but are without other
means than admonitions to ascertain or control the practice.”109
There is more to the analogy than a shared secrecy and elusive nature,
however. Indeed, the actual decision-making processes—how deals are made in
each context—do not differ all that much. After observing simulated deliberat-
ing juries, Reid Hastie articulated two theories of deliberation style: evidence-
driven and verdict-driven.110 Evidence-driven deliberation ought to be familiar
to criminal-law movie watchers: individual jurors focus on reconstructing the
story of the crime, cite evidence in reference to several verdict options, and do
not vote or take a poll until later in the deliberation.111
At least equally likely to occur, however, is verdict-driven deliberation.112
Under this style, deliberation begins with a public ballot.113 Jurors then “align[]
[themselves] in opposing factions by verdict preferences” and begin to “act[] as
advocates for their positions.”114 “Evidence is cited in support of a specific
106. Barkow, supra note 104, at 871.
107. Indeed, several scholars suggest that compromise verdicts date back to seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England. See, e.g., Kemmitt, supra note 15, at 93. According to this scholar,
although English juries were “[f]ormally . . . fact-finding bodies,” they were “functionally . . . a quasi-
sentencing body”: “When faced with an unduly harsh sanction, the jury would act as a sentencing
mitigator, either by entering a compromise verdict in which the defendant was convicted of a lesser
charge or by acquitting the defendant outright.” Id. at 94–95.
108. See, e.g., Duk v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 320 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging
the possibility of a compromise verdict, but choosing instead to “presume that citizen jurors will
properly perform the duties entrusted them”).
109. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953), overruled in part by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
110. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 163. For discussion of these styles in
subsequent literature, see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1274–76 (2000).
111. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 163.
112. Hastie and colleagues found that approximately two-thirds of juries engaged in some sort of
verdict-driven deliberation: 28% of juries engaged in pure verdict-driven deliberation (judging by how
early in the process they took a vote), 35% engaged in evidence-driven deliberation, and 38% displayed
a mixed style. See id. at 164. Subsequent researchers observed that the breakdown of verdict-driven and
evidence-driven deliberation styles among mock jurors was an even 50–50. See Devine et al., supra
note 7, at 693 (citing Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’
Predisposition To Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984)). Not
surprisingly, verdict-driven deliberation was more common when a unanimous verdict was not required
and the total deliberation time for juries undergoing verdict-driven deliberation was shorter. HASTIE,
PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 165.
113. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 163.
114. Id.
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verdict position,” “[i]ndividual jurors advocate only one verdict position at a
time,” and polling or voting happens frequently.115
This verdict-driven description of a negotiation—the kind perhaps most
likely to produce compromise verdicts—should start to sound familiar. The jury
factions that form and advocate for verdict preferences are analogous to the
roles filled by prosecutors and defense attorneys in plea-bargained cases. This is
particularly true in light of the group polarization effect.116 Recall that indi-
vidual judgments become more extreme through discussion. In effect, some
jurors become quasi-prosecutors in jury discussions while others become quasi-
defense attorneys. These juror–advocates then engage in a give and take—using
the verdict alternatives as steps in their negotiation—until a compromise is
reached.
B. SIMILAR DRIVES TO COMPROMISE
A second aspect of the analogy is that both jurors and plea negotiators are
motivated to make a deal. Guilty pleas are typically justified by the limited
budgets and resources facing prosecutors and public defenders.117 George Fisher
explains that plea bargaining was born as a “marvelously efficient relief from a
suffocating workload.”118 Jurors, however, are also individuals with jobs and
responsibilities and constraints on their time.119 Negotiation and compromise—
long thought of as efficient methods for dispute resolution among prosecutors
and defense attorneys—may be equally attractive to jurors who are in a hurry to
return to their daily responsibilities and who have been encouraged by the judge
not to return without a unanimous verdict.
The connection between the negotiations goes further, however. Besides the
common general incentives to compromise, the specific motivations of jurors
who negotiate—what it is that drives them to make a deal—mirror the consider-
ations that prompt plea deals.
One can imagine a negotiation within a jury evolving in many ways. Con-
sider, for example, a “mercy” deal. A juror may think the defendant committed
the highest crime charged, but he may also be nervous about the consequences
115. Id.
116. See HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 69–70; Schade, Sunstein, & Hastie, supra
note 71.
117. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2477 (“To put it bluntly, appointed or flat-fee defense lawyers can
make more money with less time and effort by pushing clients to plead.”); Wright & Engen, supra note
104, at 1949 (“District Attorneys must economize, selecting their highest priority cases to receive the
most time and resources from their limited budgets, while the bulk of cases must be resolved without
the expense of a trial.”).
118. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (2000), reprinted in GEORGE
FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
119. Hastie and colleagues found that some jurors viewed deliberation as a “rough and occasionally
punishing experience” that took a toll on their personal commitments outside the courtroom. HASTIE,
PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 173. Juror questionnaires revealed that escaping deliberation
and returning to personal commitments motivated at least some of the jurors to shift their verdict
preference from one faction to another and ultimately produce a compromise verdict. See id.
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being too severe, or he may believe that the defendant deserves leniency for
some reason (his age, his background, his role in the offense). As a result, that
juror is willing to compromise on a lesser offense with his colleagues, who in
turn make a deal to avoid deadlock.
On the other end of the spectrum is the “hold him accountable for something”
deal. A juror could retain reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt on the
charged crimes but think that the defendant did something wrong and is a threat
to public safety. He wants to ensure the defendant is held accountable—or at
least not released—so he is willing to compromise the reasonable doubt stan-
dard and convict on a lesser-included offense.
Or maybe the driving force of the compromise is a prediction of the future—a
“preempting a second jury” deal. A juror may strongly believe the defendant is
innocent, but he is afraid that a hung jury will result in an eventual conviction
down the road. Thus, he leverages his holdout vote to compromise and secure a
more lenient verdict than what might otherwise be reached. And the eleven
other jurors, in turn, vote to compromise on a more lenient charge because they
want to ensure a second jury does not acquit.
A terrific example of these various dynamics of jury compromise can be seen
in the ABC documentary series, In the Jury Room.120 ABC filmmakers were
permitted to videotape a trial and subsequent jury deliberation. Defendant Laura
Trujillo was accused of child abuse resulting in the death of her child; her
boyfriend had confessed and pled guilty to dealing the fatal blow, but under
state law the mother could be held complicit if she knew of the risk and did
nothing to prevent it.121 There were five possible verdicts given to the jury,
reflecting lesser-included child-abuse charges under Colorado law. These op-
tions ranged in sentence consequences (although the jury did not know) from
forty-eight years in prison to probation.122
After agreeing that Ms. Trujillo was not guilty of the most serious charge, the
jury quickly split into two camps. Half of them wanted to convict Ms. Trujillo
of the charge accompanied by a reckless mens rea: she should have foreseen the
risk of serious harm given the history of abuse to the child. The other half
thought the death was not foreseeable and wanted to convict on the lowest
possible negligence charge.123
Their debates involved some factual questions: one juror argued, for ex-
ample, that the defendant must have known of the child’s prior broken ribs.124
But the discussion involved other considerations as well—factors apart from
questions of what actually happened that night. In this vein, some jurors called
for accountability: “When does Laura take responsibility for this child? When?
120. In the Jury Room: Colorado v. Laura Trujillo (ABC television broadcast Aug. 17, 2004).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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It’s too late now.”125 And some jurors called for mercy, arguing that it was not
fair to hold the defendant accountable for the death of her child when “her
actions did not cause it.”126
Ultimately one juror in the Trujillo case called for a truce: “In order to avoid
a hung jury,” he said, “both sides are going to have to give some conces-
sions.”127 That juror then pointed to the four remaining verdict options on the
board in front of them and called for a compromise on a charge in the middle.128
His personal reason for reaching the deal was to ensure the defendant was
somehow punished: “I’m not getting what I want here. But I cannot walk out of
this room [without] holding her responsible for what she did [somehow].”129
Others, perhaps, voted for the deal because they did not want a subsequent jury
to convict on the highest charge. In the end, the compromise carried the day; for
their various reasons, the jurors met in the middle and convicted Ms. Trujillo on
a lesser-included offense that was actually (unbeknownst to them) a misde-
meanor.130
These different motivations for compromise verdicts will likely prompt a
variety of reactions depending on one’s normative positions. But what is
important for present purposes is that all three brands of jury compromises—a
mercy deal, an accountability deal, a “preempting a second jury” deal—reflect
the same considerations that play a vital part in plea bargain discussions every
day.
The U.S. Attorney’s manual, for instance, lists several factors prosecutors
should weigh when deciding whether to enter a plea agreement, including:
“[t]he defendant’s remorse or contrition” (mercy), the nature of the offense and
the defendant’s history (accountability or public safety), and “the likelihood of
obtaining a conviction at trial” (prediction).131 To be sure, there are other factors
a prosecutor accounts for that a juror does not consider—whether the defendant
cooperates in another case, for example. But the overlap in the reasons for
making a deal—which notably, in both instances, include a forecast of the
expected sentence—is larger than one might initially suspect.
As the ABC documentary demonstrates, and the jury studies confirm, it is
simply unrealistic to assume that jurors deliberate over facts and prosecutors
negotiate over sentence implications. It is more accurate to recognize that both
types of actors negotiate and make deals for a whole host of reasons—reasons
that, interestingly enough, are not all that different from one another.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Brown & Bunnell, supra note 105, at 1076 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.420 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading
_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.420).
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C. SIMILAR BARGAINING PITFALLS
A jury’s negotiation also suffers from many of the same defects that plague
the plea-bargaining system. Scholars like Stephanos Bibas have explained that
plea deals are skewed by anchoring and framing tendencies.132 Assume, for
example, that a prosecutor adds up every possible charge and enhancement to
offer a defendant a deal that would result in twenty years in prison. Even if the
defendant rejects this offer as unduly severe, it can still affect the ultimate
outcome by playing on framing or anchoring tendencies. If the prosecutor next
offers a deal resulting in fifteen years, this option may seem reasonable to the
defendant in relation to the first offer, even if it would not have seemed so had it
been offered in the first instance.133
The same phenomenon can be seen with jury decisions. We have seen that
when a jury considers multiple verdict options, the framing of the choice makes
a difference. When (as in Mark Kelman’s experiment) a special circumstances
murder verdict option represents the high end of the available options, the
compromise middle choice is raised as well.134 And, as in plea bargaining,
anchoring and framing in intrajury negotiation give rise to Bibas’s same con-
cerns. Prosecutors—aware of jury compromise—may well charge in anticipa-
tion of that reality and select a crime that carries more severe consequences than
what they think is just. This “overcharge” sets an artificially high anchor, which
in turn elevates whatever option will appear to the jury as the middle compro-
mise, skewing the final result.
Another plea-bargaining critique that can be applied to intrajury negotiation
involves “charge bargains”—deals made when the defendant pleads guilty in
exchange not only for the chance at a more lenient sentence but also to a less
serious charge altogether. In fact, Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen have
observed that
[a]ny quick review of court statistics—or a single afternoon spent in the
hallways of a criminal courthouse—will confirm that criminal charges move.
The more serious charges filed at the start of the case often move down to less
serious charges that form the basis for a guilty plea and conviction.135
Wright and Engen were speaking about plea bargaining, but they could just as
easily be speaking about compromise verdicts. Regardless of whether lawyers
in search of a plea haggle back and forth over possible charges, or jurors in
search of unanimity adjust their verdict preference to find a middle ground, in both
scenarios, a criminal verdict reflects a settlement. The charge is not as tough as it
could be, and it is not an acquittal; it falls in the middle, like the end result of
132. Bibas, supra note 2, at 2514–19.
133. Id. at 2517–18.
134. See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7; supra text accompanying note 7.
135. Wright & Engen, supra note 102, at 9.
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many negotiations. Jurors too, in other words, participate in charge movement.
If charge movement happens on a jury, however, it is important to remember
the controversy that surrounds it in its original plea-bargaining context.136 Two
central critiques emerge. Some are concerned that similarly situated offenders
receive similar treatment. Great steps have been taken to ensure uniformity at
sentencing, and these reforms are undermined if the real work is being done
behind the scenes through a charge negotiation. The risk is that “[u]nfettered
charge bargaining could result in judicial sentencing discretion just being
replaced by prosecutorial charging discretion,” which would circumvent efforts,
like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, to guarantee uniformity of sentences for
those who commit similar crimes.137
The second concern is that charge bargaining naturally leads to “overcharg-
ing” by prosecutors who have an incentive to do so for leverage in plea
negotiations.138 The fear here concerns inaccurate and excessive results.139
Innocent defendants, for example, tend to be risk averse, and very harsh charges
may scare an innocent person into pleading to a lesser and more certain
punishment.140
These two common charge-bargaining concerns apply equally to intrajury
negotiation. First, if charge bargaining produces arbitrary and inconsistent
results across defendants who commit similar crimes, that risk holds equally
true for intrajury negotiation. Different juries compromise in different ways,
making charge movement a matter of fortune for similarly situated defendants.
Plus, a jury only sees one defendant and one crime; jurors are unaware of the
universe of crimes and the charges that typically attach to them. So when a jury
decides to compromise and discount an aggravated assault charge to a plain
assault charge, for example, it does so without regard to the sentencing conse-
quences of that decision and without the knowledge of how “bad” this assault
was compared to similar ones. This certainly can lead to inconsistent results
across similarly situated defendants, perhaps even more so than with charge
bargaining in the traditional sense.
Similarly, the “overcharging” problem also applies to intrajury negotiation.
Once the jury has control of the case, the prosecutor is not likely to drop a
charge that he knows was too high at the outset. The risk of arbitrary verdicts resulting
136. It is presumably recognition of these criticisms that led the DOJ to prohibit charge bargaining
by federal prosecutors (a prohibition observed formally, if not in practice). See Bowman, supra note
105, at 193.
137. Ahmed E. Taha, The Equilibrium Effect of Legal Rule Changes: Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Being Circumvented?, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 251, 251 (2001).
138. Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 449
(2009); Meares, supra note 16, at 863 (“The prosecutor can, and regularly does, use discretion in
charging to influence greatly a defendant’s decision to plead guilty in any particular case.”).
139. This risk has led at least one scholar to suggest that prosecutors receive financial bonuses for
securing convictions on the charge filed, as a way to counteract the incentive to overcharge and engage
in charge bargaining. Meares, supra note 16, at 873–77.
140. Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1984–85; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1947–48.
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from a gaming of the system, therefore, is even higher when the prosecutor
relinquishes control over the charges, and the overcharged case goes to a jury.
To date, the dangers of overcharging, charge bargaining, and framing deals have
been discussed only with respect to plea bargaining. But the recognition that jurors
negotiate means that if one is worried about negotiation problems in the context
of plea bargaining, those concerns should carry over to jury trials as well.
D. SIMILAR PRACTICAL REALITIES
The final similarity between plea bargaining and compromise verdicts is that
both seem largely unavoidable as a practical matter. Whether you love plea
bargaining or whether you, as George Fisher put it, resign to its dominance
“though its victory merits no fanfare,” most people agree that plea bargaining is
here to stay.141 To be sure, some scholars have argued that plea bargaining is not
inevitable and should be abolished;142 that argument is certainly bolstered by
the fact that many other countries do not dispose of criminal cases through plea
deals.143 I make no claim on the wisdom or costs of those reform suggestions. I
merely concur with those who have made the descriptive claim that—for the
foreseeable future at least—there seems to be no political will to reform
American procedures in such a way that would eliminate plea bargaining.144
This resignation has shaped the way people view plea bargaining and the way
scholars critique it. The vast majority of those who weigh in on the plea-
bargaining debate in America now acknowledge that “bargaining itself is too
entrenched to abolish.”145
Negotiation among jurors is perhaps more entrenched than is negotiation for
pleas, albeit for different reasons.146 As one might intuitively expect, any time a
group of people is asked to unanimously decide an issue when multiple alterna-
tives are available—a city council passing an ordinance, stockholders electing a
chairman of the board, Congress passing an appropriations bill—compromise
and negotiation follow as a matter of course. This phenomenon has been
confirmed by social scientists, both within the context of the jury and in more
141. Fisher, supra note 118, at 859; see also Bibas, supra note 2, at 2527–28 (“I take it as a given
that plea bargaining is here to stay.”).
142. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1048–49 (1983) (“I confess to some bafflement
concerning the insistence of most lawyers and judges that plea bargaining is inevitable and desirable.”);
Schulhofer, supra note 5.
143. Alschuler, supra note 142, at 976–77 (observing that “[t]he criminal procedures of continental
Europe . . . provide the principal illustration of the ability of advanced legal systems to avoid reliance
on plea bargaining”).
144. Bibas, supra note 2, at 2527–28; see also Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) (noting that “plea bargaining seems to be growing only more
entrenched over time”).
145. Bibas, supra note 2, at 2528; see also O’Hear, supra note 144; Wright & Miller, supra note 2,
at 1417.
146. See discussion supra Part I.
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general group decision settings.147 It seems the very nature of group decision
making almost inevitably leads to some sort of negotiation and concession.
Acknowledging this practical reality of compromise in group decision mak-
ing requires a shift in jury reform strategy, much like the shift that has occurred
among those who wish to reform plea bargaining.148 Most plea bargaining
reformists now seek modifications in the process, rather than outright abolition
of the practice.149 This strategic shift is, in my view, the greatest lesson from
plea bargaining to be applied towards an understanding of intrajury negotiation.
If jurors negotiate with each other in the jury room just as prosecutors and
defense attorneys do in the back halls of the courthouse, then maybe we should
treat compromise verdicts the way we treat plea bargains—not as a risk with
which we do not know what to do, but as a reality we must address, correcting
as many injustices about the process as possible.
To date, intrajury negotiation and compromise criminal verdicts are treated
like old family secrets: we know they happen, but we do not really talk about
them and we do not think anything can be done about them anyway.150 This is
the wrong approach. Negotiation and compromise are not hidden aspects of
criminal adjudication. Indeed, they are now dominant in our criminal law—
together they represent the manner in which the vast majority of cases are
decided. Why do we acknowledge this reality and yet ignore that the same
negotiation can take place in a jury room?
For the most part, modern American plea-bargaining scholars take the exis-
tence of negotiation in criminal law as a given.151 Should not jury scholars
147. See discussion supra Part I; see also James D. Laing & Benjamin Slotznick, When Anyone Can
Veto: A Laboratory Study of Committees Governed by Unanimous Rule, 36 BEHAV. SCI. 179, 185–86,
192 (1991); Charles E. Miller & Rick Crandall, Experimental Research on the Social Psychology of
Bargaining and Coalition Formation, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 333, 334 (Paul B. Paulus ed.,
1980). Psychologist Charles Miller, to take one example, conducted a study using three-person groups
in which the members were induced to have preferences using monetary payoffs. Miller designed the
study so that two of the members held preferences that were somewhat similar—close together on a
spectrum—but the third member’s position was extreme relative to the other two. See Charles E. Miller,
Group Decision Making Under Majority and Unanimity Decision Rules, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 51, 54–59
& fig. 2 (1985)
148. To be clear, I do not claim that the same social pressures that lead to jury compromise also lead
to plea bargaining. The origin and causes of plea bargaining are topics beyond the scope of this Article.
My claim is only that because of the practical reality that compromise verdicts are likely to occur, jury
scholars should alter their strategies for reform, much like the approach adopted by most modern plea
bargaining scholars.
149. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2527–28; Wright & Miller, supra note 2, at 1417–18. But see
Schulhofer, supra note 5.
150. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953), overruled in part by Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964) (“Courts uniformly disapprove compromise verdicts but are without other means
than admonitions to ascertain or control the practice.”); Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 7,
at 305 (“‘Compromise’ effects are well known to both district attorneys and defenders . . . .”). Compro-
mise verdicts have received more attention from legal scholars on the civil side. See, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 231 (2001), but far
less ink has been spilled on compromise criminal verdicts.
151. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 2, at 2527–28; O’Hear, supra note 144.
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follow suit? Instead of comparing a jury trial to a bench trial (the classic
technique for those who evaluate the jury),152 perhaps we should compare it to a
different alternative: the plea-bargaining process that largely controls criminal
law. Recognizing the practical reality and viewing the jury as a negotiating body
is an important first step toward evaluating jury negotiation and potentially
reforming it.
III. THE DIFFERENCES
At this stage, it is probably hard to deny the impulse to point out all the
differences between intrajury and plea negotiations. Much in fact can be learned
from the important differences between the two. If we accept that jurors
negotiate in ways that look like plea bargaining, and that a jury verdict—like a
plea—can represent a compromise, then our evaluation of intrajury negotiation
is informed by whether that bargaining process is more fair or less fair than
the one with which we are most familiar. This evaluation is aided by an
understanding of several important differences between the two negotiating
contexts: (a) different negotiators, (b) different negotiating conditions, and
(c) different interaction with substantive law.
A. DIFFERENT NEGOTIATORS
The first and most obvious difference between intrajury and plea negotiations
is that the negotiating actors are not the same. Plea negotiations are handled by
professionals—prosecutors and defense attorneys—whereas jury negotiations
are handled by local citizens. Furthermore, the criminal defendant (at least in
theory) is a participant in one negotiation but is absent from the other. These
distinctions carry significant implications.
First, prosecutors and defense attorneys—unlike jurors off the street—are
“repeat players” who regularly work closely with each other.153 This can make a
difference in bargaining.154 A prosecutor who knows he will work with a
defense attorney again may be more prone to compromise than would two
jurors who disagree and have little chance of interacting in the future. To the
extent one thinks “holdout” jurors should stick to their guns and not yield to
compromise pressure, they are perhaps more likely to do so than are actors who
see each other regularly and want to develop a reputation as cooperative.
More importantly, prosecutors and defense lawyers, because they are repeat
players, know the relevant local history; they know what charges and what
152. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 9 (“[M]ost praise or blame of the jury can come only by
way of the comparison of trial by jury with trial by a judge, the one serious and significant alternative to
it.”).
153. Bibas, supra note 2, at 2481.
154. Id. at 2480.
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punishments are usually visited on people who do what the defendant did.155
They “understand the intricate, technical rules that regulate arrests, searches and
seizures, interrogations, discovery, evidence, and sentencing, as well as the
going rates in plea bargaining.”156 They know whether the crime in front of
them is particularly egregious compared to others like it, and they know the sort
of “market price” or typical punishment that accompanies it.157
This is all valuable information that jurors do not have. When jurors negotiate
between possible charges, they do so blindly. Not only are they in the dark
about the local custom or “going rate” for criminal charges, but jurors are also
generally not told about any of the sentence implications—even the mandatory
minimums—that attach to each charge.158 In federal court and in most state
courts, the “party line,” as one scholar put it, “is that the jury exists merely to
find facts: juries make factual determinations and judges sentence, end of
story.”159
Just because jurors are not given information about punishments, however,
does not mean that they do not make their own assumptions on that score, even
if erroneous.160 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that juries routinely antici-
pate punishments and that verdicts are significantly affected by what jurors
predict will happen to the defendant upon conviction—regardless of the accu-
racy of those predictions.161 For example, the mandatory minimum in New
155. See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006).
156. Id.
157. Consider, for example, Milton Heumann’s description of typical negotiation practices in one
state court:
Typically, in the circuit court, a line forms outside the prosecutor’s office the morning before
court is convened. Defense attorneys shuffle into the prosecutor’s office and, in a matter of
two or three minutes, dispose of the one or more cases ‘set down’ that day. Generally, only a
few words have to be exchanged before agreement is reached. The defense attorney mutters
something about the defendant, the prosecutor reads the police report, and concurrence on
‘what to do’ generally, but not always, emerges.
MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
35 (1978); see also DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION
103–18 (1984) (discussing both “routine processing” and adversarial negotiations in the context of plea
bargaining).
158. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing
Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1242 (1995) (“The general rule in federal and most state
judicial systems is that neither the judge nor advocates should inform the jury of the sentencing
consequences of a guilty verdict. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the court may even
specifically instruct the jury not to consider punishment in reaching its verdict.” (footnotes omitted)).
159. Kemmitt, supra note 15. This view has, in fact, been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“It is well established that when a jury has no
sentencing function, it should be admonished to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence
might be imposed.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975))).
160. See Lillquist, supra note 8, at 670.
161. Kalven and Zeisel found that jurors “anticipate[] punishment” and are prone to nullify when
they think it will be too harsh. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 306 (discussing cases in which juries
considered a conviction’s consequences on the defendant’s job prospects). Several psychology experi-
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York for a conviction of first-degree assault is the same as the mandatory
minimum sentence for attempted murder.162 Defense lawyers and prosecutors
are aware of this facet of the New York penal code, but the typical juror is
probably not. It is not hard to imagine a juror negotiating with his fellow jurors,
falsely assuming that attempted murder carries more significant consequences
than does the assault charge and adjusting his vote to compromise accordingly.
Despite those disadvantages, jurors have several advantages relative to negoti-
ating lawyers. First, precisely because they have not seen many cases in the
past, jurors approach each trial without the cynical baggage that may accom-
pany prosecutors and defense attorneys.163 As G. K. Chesterton put it,
the horrible thing about all legal officials . . . is simply that they have got used
to it.
Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual
man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment; they
only see their own workshop.164
Jurors are likely to be less cynical. That is a useful sensibility: when we convict
innocents, we probably do so in part through excessive cynicism.165 There is
something powerful and important about a fresh set of eyes assessing the merits
of each criminal case. If the fate of a criminal defendant is to be negotiated in
any event, perhaps it is preferable to have bargainers who do not come to the
table jaded by a life’s work surrounded by crimes and criminals.
Relatedly, jurors negotiate without being encumbered by another criticism
often launched at prosecutors and defense attorneys: agency failure.166 In plea
ments also show that verdicts are dramatically affected by what jurors think will happen to the
defendant at sentencing. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 159, 166 n.69 (1988).
162. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (Consol. Supp. 2010). Attempted murder and assault in the first
degree are both classified as class B felony offenses with mandatory minimums of five years imprison-
ment. Id.
163. See Dr. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–19
(1975) (detailing empirical evidence that experienced prosecutors manifest “conviction psychology”—
“[t]he set of attitudes held by the prosecutor tending to buttress his emphasis on convictions”—and
presume guilt); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 206 (1988) (describing “conviction psychology” as a powerful force on career
prosecutors). This cynicism extends beyond prosecutors to the repeat players on the defense end as
well. Alan Dershowitz, who is known to be pro-defense, has said “almost all criminal defendants are, in
fact guilty,” and that “all criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and believe that.” Joshua
Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 865
(2005) (quoting ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
164. G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 85–86 (1925).
165. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.
669, 689–90 (“[T]he assimilation of a conviction psychology . . . makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for the prosecutor to protect the innocently accused.”).
166. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1306–13; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52, 105–12 (1968); Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1987–91; see also
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bargaining, as Stephen Schulhofer has explained, “[t]he real parties in interest
(the public and the defendant) are represented by agents (the prosecutor and the
defense attorney [respectively]) whose goals are far from congruent with those
of their principals.”167 Prosecutors, for example, have many reasons to plea
bargain independent of the public’s interest: they may pursue pleas to get a high
conviction rate in order to build reputation or political standing, they may plea
bargain to avoid high-profile losses at trial for the same reasons, they may reach
a deal to build goodwill with a defense attorney they work with often, or they
may plea bargain simply to avoid lengthy trials for personal reasons.168
Agency costs exist on the defense side as well. Criminal defense attorneys are
almost never paid by the hour; many criminal defendants are not paying clients,
and those who are generally pay a flat fee up front.169 Moreover, appointed
attorneys are typically paid the same fee for guilty pleas and for cases that go to
trial.170 Not only are these fees notoriously low,171 but in most states there is no
additional payment for co-counsel even in a serious or complex case, and, in
any event, payment is not remitted until the charges are fully concluded.172
Thus, there are “powerful financial incentives for the attorney to settle as
promptly as possible” even if a trial would be in the client’s best interest.173 And
while public defenders “have no immediate financial incentive to avoid trial,”
their organizations have their own institutional pressures, which include an
overwhelming caseload and strong incentives to move cases along.174
When jurors negotiate with each other, by contrast, they are not acting as
agents of anyone. On the one hand, this is quite troubling. The lack of agency
means there is no guarantee that the classic prosecutor and defense roles will
map on to a jury; there may be twelve “quasi-prosecutors,” for example, and no
defense representative at all. It also leaves open the possibility that no juror is
acting in the public interest—that each juror is out for himself, motivated by
private biases and personal incentives. And, perhaps most concerning, the lack
of agency in the jury room means that a defendant will not participate in a
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
959, 979 (2009) (suggesting that the problem of prosecutorial discretion should be approached as a
problem of agency costs); Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of
Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 72–74 (2007) (noting that the prosecutor may have
“incentives that diverge from those of the social ideal”).
167. Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1987.
168. Id. at 1987–88.
169. Id. at 1988.
170. Id. at 1989.
171. Id. (citing data from a 1986 survey that found that compensation caps were as low as $500 a
case for felonies and sometimes only $1000 in capital cases).
172. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (West 2007) (providing that attorneys can only file for
compensation within thirty days of the completion of the case); TENN. SUPR. CT. R. 13(2)(b) (“Co-
counsel or associate attorneys in non-capital cases shall not be compensated.”); cf. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-14-206 (West 2006) (delegating to the Tennessee Supreme Court the authority to decide what can
and cannot be compensated).
173. Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1989.
174. Id. at 1989–90.
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negotiation that decides his fate.
On the other hand, because the vast majority of criminal defendants are
indigent and the hard reality is that public defenders are overworked and
underfunded, there are strong reasons to doubt the adequacy of the average
defendant’s participation in plea bargaining anyway.175 Moreover, to the extent
one trusts the jury as a fair and impartial decision-making body representing a
cross section of the defendant’s peers and driven by a sense of moral or civic
duty, there is little reason to assume that the conflicts of interest or incentive
problems well recognized in plea bargaining will hold true for negotiating jurors
as well. Perhaps jurors are influenced by improper factors external to the
case—such as a selfish desire to end the deliberation quickly—but at the very
least they negotiate without the systemic financial incentives or reputation
interests that are often attributed to their professional counterparts.176
The lack of agency points to a further distinction between the two negotiating
contexts: different starting points. In plea bargaining, each party sets out to
bargain—each agent seeks from the start to get the best deal for his client. In
jury negotiation, by contrast, the starting goal is consensus, and the deal comes
because agreement on one verdict is too difficult to reach. Compare, by analogy,
negotiations between an individual buyer and seller over the price of a used car,
and negotiations between Bluebook executives trying to determine a fair price
about the same used car.177 The first set of deal makers are negotiating from the
get-go and their goal is to achieve the best result for themselves, whereas the
second set of decision makers reach a compromise (if at all) as a second-best
solution because they do not view the relevant data the same way and just
cannot otherwise agree.178
In the criminal context, the prevailing view is that deals between prosecutor
and defense attorney (the individual car buyer and seller) are acceptable, but
deals between jurors (the Bluebook executives) are not. This intuition seems
misguided. In terms of reaching more accurate results (or, if you prefer, the
“fairest” price), does it really matter that the first pair of negotiators sought a
deal all along, while the second set compromised only after consensus was not
possible? It is quite plausible, in my view, that the fairest price of a 2006 Honda
175. See Schulhofer, supra note 5, 1988 (“On the defense side, agency problems are similar, though
possibly more acute.”). This troubling aspect of the criminal justice system has been well-documented.
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006); Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional
Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 488–89 (2010); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 93 (2007).
176. The extent to which jurors are influenced by factors external to the evidence in the case they
must decide has drawn a lot of attention from jury research scholars, but is largely beyond the scope of
this Article. For a good discussion on the subject, see Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker &
Stolle, supra note 70, at 136–48. For further discussion of some of this literature, see MacCoun, supra
note 7, at 224.
177. I am indebted to Nancy Combs for this useful analogy.
178. To be sure, this car analogy is not perfect because the prosecutor—unlike the car seller—is
supposed to be searching for a just outcome and not just for the best outcome he can get.
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Accord is better set by disinterested evaluators who compromise not to reach
the best deal for themselves (as would be the case for the actors who set out to
bargain), but instead as a settlement that reflects the group’s judgment upon
assessing all of the relevant data. Likewise, it is odd to distrust jury compro-
mises—deals made by neutral people who have heard all the admissible evi-
dence—when we find acceptable plea deals that are made quickly, without all
the information, and by agents who may not adequately represent the affected
parties.
B. DIFFERENT NEGOTIATING CONDITIONS
Another way in which intrajury and plea negotiations are significantly differ-
ent is that the bargainers negotiate under different conditions. To begin with,
prosecutors are commonly thought of as being in the position of power in
negotiations: they can stack charges, set deadlines, limit and control discovery,
force the waiver of appellate review, and of course they have the discretion to
choose what charges are brought in the first place.179 Jurors, by contrast, are
relative equals in the jury room: they all have the same access to information,
they all have the same verdict options in front of them, and they each have one
vote.
This contrast is a bit of an oversimplification. The prosecutor is not always in
the position of power. Sometimes defendants have the upper hand because they
hold leverage in being able to cooperate against other defendants or see
significant weaknesses in the government’s case.180 At the same time, jurors are
not always on equal footing. When a unanimous verdict is required, jurors in
minority factions—potential holdout jurors—may face tremendous pressure to
back down or may hold tremendous power to get what they want.181 Generally
speaking, however, if for no other reason than that the prosecutor gets to select
the charge options while all jurors are constrained by them, the balance of
power among negotiators is very different for intrajury negotiations than it is for
plea negotiations.
How does this affect our impression of intrajury negotiation? In my view, it
tells us that there are at least some ways in which intrajury negotiation is
preferable to plea bargaining. Lay negotiators—unlike professional ones—are
isolated from political and financial incentives, and they are equals who do not
face the power imbalance that is the target of so many plea-bargaining critiques.
179. O’Hear, supra note 144, at 425 (pointing out the “massive power imbalances between prosecu-
tors and defendants” in plea bargaining); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as
Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004) (“The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal
sentencing system . . . is the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over federal
prosecution and sentencing.”).
180. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 664 (2006) (explaining the
“‘cooperation paradox’: that is, defendants who are more deeply enmeshed in the criminal milieu may
be better able to leverage leniency for themselves than lower-level players”).
181. See HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 50, at 99–102; MacCoun, supra note 7, at 228.
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To the extent one values the egalitarian nature of a jury or its ability to deliver
“common sense justice,” one will likewise value that feature of intrajury
negotiation.182
Moreover, in terms of decision-making competence, a jury brings more to the
table than just common sense. Unlike the prosecutor and defense attorney, a
jury has seen all the evidence in a case, and only the admissible evidence at that.
In a way, therefore, jurors negotiate and reach compromises with more informa-
tion than do their professional counterparts—or at least with “purer,” only
legally admissible information.
One of the most familiar arguments against plea bargaining is that it invites
innocent people to plead guilty because prosecutors and defense lawyers have
so little information at the time of bargaining. The information vacuum, in other
words, invites risk-averse people to cut a deal regardless of the merits of their
cases.183 This criticism does not apply to intrajury negotiation since that negotia-
tion occurs after all of the admissible evidence has been aired at trial. In this
way, intrajury negotiation is preferable to plea bargaining because at least we
know that a jury’s compromise is informed by evidence.
C. DIFFERENT INTERACTION WITH SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Finally, as we ponder the important differences between intrajury and plea
negotiations, it is worth asking how each affects and is affected by substantive
criminal law.
Bill Stuntz has argued that legislators tend to overcriminalize (creating new
crimes and attaching harsh consequences to criminal behavior) to gain political
favor while depending on prosecutors to dial it down to the appropriate level
with their charging decisions.184 Legislators are rational actors, and they will
almost always vote to authorize “a level of punishment that is appropriate in a
182. Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 402–03 (2009)
(attributing this “communitarian view” of the jury right to the Supreme Court’s Apprendi line of cases).
183. Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 73, 89–91 (2009); see also David Bjerk, Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits
of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 305, 306 (2007)
(“[A]ny new evidence that arises in the time leading up to trial generally strengthens the case against a
guilty defendant, but generally weakens the case against an innocent defendant.”); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE
L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) (“[It is likely that] innocent defendants as a class are significantly more risk
averse than guilty defendants as a class, [so] a prosecutor’s failure to internalize a defendant’s private
information will cost the prosecutor nothing because the defendant, even if innocent, will take the deal
anyway.”).
184. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2558 (2004). Bill Stuntz is not the only one to tell this story of overcriminalization. For
other similar accounts, see generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703 (2005); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization,
91 VA. L. REV. 879 (2005). But see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 223, 234–49 (2007) (arguing that the overcriminalization story is more accurate about the federal
system than state systems).
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few very bad cases but excessive in a great many other[s]” when they know it
will be popular with their constituents and can be checked by prosecutorial
discretion later on.185 “It sounds odd,” Stuntz tells us, “but legislators’ incentive
is to vote for rules that even the legislators themselves think are too harsh.”186
The result is that criminal law has become very broad and very severe; we
have criminalized the removal of tags from mattresses, for example, and we
attach mandatory and perhaps “extraordinarily harsh penalties” for a variety of
common drug offenses.187 The interaction of this expansive criminal code with
the dominance of plea bargaining creates a system in which prosecutors are
afforded tremendous power, and their choices become more important than the
words on the pages of the criminal code. This is so because the “menu” of
criminal law from which prosecutors “order” is so large that the legislature can
dramatically change the definition of a relevant crime or the applicable sen-
tence, and plea bargains will not be affected.188 The irony, according to Stuntz,
is that “the more [criminal law] expands, the less it matters.”189
As we have just learned, however, not all bargained cases involve a
prosecutor. Sometimes—for a variety of reasons—the prosecutor delegates
his ultimate charging discretion to a jury. When this happens, a set of
laypeople are given a modified and truncated version of the prosecutor’s
menu and then negotiate with each other to find a verdict in the middle.
Common citizens, in other words, charge bargain with criminal law that was
written on the understanding that it would be toned down by an agent of the
state. Is this a problem?
To answer this question, let us take the case of Cheryl Hunte.190 Ms. Hunte
accompanied her boyfriend on a road trip in which he bought and sold mari-
juana.191 She did not plan the trip, she did not purchase or handle the drugs, and
she did not profit from the sale.192 Because there was “some nexus between
[Ms. Hunte] and the drugs,” her actions technically met the relevant statutory
definitions, and the prosecutor charged her with conspiracy and possession with
intent to distribute narcotics.193
It is possible that the prosecutor did not believe Ms. Hunte deserved the harsh
consequences that attach to drug conspiracy convictions. Perhaps he brought the
185. Stuntz, supra note 184, at 2557–58.
186. Id. at 2558.
187. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 195 (2008); see generally Kyron Huigens, What
Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811 (2002).
188. Stuntz, supra note 184, at 2549; see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510–11 (2001) (arguing that the relationship between prosecu-
tors and legislators tends to lead to broader criminal codes).
189. Stuntz, supra note 184, at 2550.
190. United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of this case, see William
J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2037–38 (2008).
191. Stuntz, supra note 190, at 2037.
192. Id.
193. Hunte, 196 F.3d at 692.
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elevated charge because office policy required him to do so, because he hoped
to use it as leverage to gain a quick plea, or maybe to secure testimony against
the boyfriend. In any event, Ms. Hunte’s case went to a jury. And a juror—
unaware of the “going rate” for cases like this one—does not know that the
charged crime is “too serious” and does not even know what consequences will
attach to it. Once the charge goes to the jury, the prosecutor’s charge bargaining
power is relinquished and new negotiators take over.
What effect does the substantive drug law have now? A juror could easily
read the broad definition of conspiracy and decide that the defendant’s behavior
meets it, even if the legislature did not actually intend to cover her actions with
its proscription. Now, the substance of the criminal law—which Stuntz tells us
was of minimum significance in plea bargaining—matters again.
A juror’s interpretation of a criminal law—different from that of a prosecu-
tor’s in large part because of a lack of information about the local history and
universe of crimes—may influence the negotiation that follows by elevating
what is to become the midpoint compromise. Once the prosecutor has delegated
his charge-bargaining power to the jury, it is out of his hands to take the high
charge off the table, despite the expectation of the legislators that the prosecutor
remains in control. The result is that broad statutory language meant to give
prosecutors hammers for plea bargaining may have unintended consequences in
the subset of cases that actually go to trial.
At least two counterpoints come to mind to alleviate this concern. First, if we
assume that the legislature has enough confidence in the prosecutor to justify
the authorization of overly harsh crimes, then maybe we should also assume it
has faith in the prosecutor to know when to go to trial and when to drop charges
before a trial. The legislature’s grant of power to the prosecution, in other
words, could include the ability to delegate charge-bargaining discretion to a
jury in the right case.
Second, on a more fundamental level, there may be a good reason to entrust
the jury with the discretion to rein in the prosecutor and the legislature—to
decide that Ms. Hunte’s actions did not really amount to a drug conspiracy even
if they fell under the technical prohibition. Maybe we want a group of local
citizens to make that call.
Cheryl Hunte faced what many refer to as a “trial tax”—an increased penalty
incurred by a defendant who elects trial over a plea.194 Trial taxes are aggra-
vated by overcriminalization and overcharging because the prosecutor does not
act as the safety valve the legislature counts on him to be. Perhaps giving the
jury an abbreviated menu of charging options—allowing jurors to charge
bargain with each other—serves to prevent excessive punishment technically
194. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1158 (2008); John H.
Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 223 (1979)
(describing “that terrible attribute that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the
sentencing differential by which the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction
after trial by comparison with that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial”).
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authorized by the words of the statutes from actually being imposed on those
whose behavior does not warrant it. Intrajury negotiation, in other words, can
mitigate concerns about overcriminalization: juries who compromise may soften
the “trial tax” that comes from defendants turning down pleas and facing
overcharges at trial.195
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: ARE COMPROMISE VERDICTS COMPROMISED?
Compromise verdicts in criminal cases are almost universally criticized.196
They have been called “improper,”197 “lawless,”198 and demeaning to fundamen-
tal principles of criminal law.199 Some have even blamed them for undermining
public confidence in the entire criminal justice system since they demonstrate
that the system is incapable of “uncovering the truth.”200
Are these critics correct? Do compromise verdicts result in compromised jus-
tice? Or has the modern American approach to criminal adjudication so em-
braced negotiation that we should not be disturbed that a jury engages in it too?
Whatever one thinks of plea bargaining generally—and I assume that plea
bargaining is here to stay as a practical matter—the normative question at hand
is whether intrajury negotiation’s resemblance to plea bargaining changes our
evaluation of compromise verdicts. To tackle this question, I will identify the
principal objections that have and can be made about compromise verdicts, and
then ask how the analogy made in this Article affects those objections. I argue
that when intrajury negotiation and plea negotiations are juxtaposed, many
objections to the former lose their force, and—perhaps more importantly—the
analogy sheds light on important potential jury reforms.
A. INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
One objection to compromise verdicts is that juries are simply not designed
to produce good negotiations. As we have established, unlike prosecutors and
195. Stuntz argues for the reintroduction of vague elements to criminal statutes—mushy elements
like “wrongful[ly]” or with a “guilty mind”—in order to encourage jury verdicts that could hold the line
against over-criminalization without the stigma of jury nullification. See Stuntz, supra note 190, at
2039. Intrajury negotiation could accomplish the same objective.
196. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 7, at 784 (“[U]seful as they may be, compromise verdicts are
lawless verdicts.”).
197. Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351,
358 n.13 (2005).
198. Muller, supra note 7, at 784.
199. See Smith, supra note 15.
200. Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 908
(2008) (citing Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (1985)). Charles Nesson argues that public trust in the
criminal justice system depends on a perception that verdicts are “statement[s] about what happened.”
Nesson, supra, at 1358. Justice Shaw, of the Florida Supreme Court, espoused one version of this view.
In a debate over Florida’s rule requiring the instruction on lesser-included offenses if requested, Justice
Shaw claimed it “sacrifices the truth-finding process on the altar of the ‘jury pardon’ by injecting
unnecessary confusion into a criminal prosecution.” State v. Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929, 932 (1986)
(Shaw, J., dissenting).
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defense attorneys, jurors are kept ignorant of the consequences of the deals they
make, and they are not acting as agents for the parties in interest (the public and
the defendant).
Recall that both institutional limitations can make for troubling negotiations.
Ill-informed deals yield a high risk of bad bargains: unjust results in individual
cases and inconsistent results across similarly situated defendants. Plus, even
though the agency relationship in traditional plea negotiations is far from
perfect, at the very least the defendant theoretically has a lawyer fighting for
him at the plea negotiating table. There is no guarantee that he has a champion
in the jury room. And it is somewhat disturbing that a defendant’s fate can be
the subject of a deal without his consent.
But the above objections paint an incomplete picture of the jury. The jury has,
in fact, other institutional features that make the jury room a good spot for
negotiating criminal verdicts—better in some ways than the back room of a
prosecutor’s office. Negotiation decisions—like other decisions—are influenced
by the nature of the decision maker. And for centuries, the jury has been
heralded because jurors have a special type of decision-making competence.201
This praise has multiple features: that jurors are equals in the jury room, that
“twelve heads are inevitably better than one,” and that the jurors’ “inexperi-
ence” and “lack in professional training” actually serve as assets “because
[they] secure[] a fresh perception of each trial.”202
If one generally values a jury’s unsullied and egalitarian approach to crim-
inal adjudication, that appreciation will apply to intrajury negotiation just as
it does to the Twelve Angry Men version of jury deliberation. Whether they
are negotiating with each other or not, jurors are still isolated from money
and reputational interests, from politics and prestige; they are still relative
equals, and their discussion benefits from the addition of different points of
view. This purity is retained even if they are making their decisions in ways we
have not always contemplated. There are, in other words, institutional features
of a jury that may foster good deals—deals struck by independent, equal peers
of the defendant searching to do the right thing.203
Moreover, the institutional objections can be answered, at least in part,
through potential reforms that are informed by the comparison to plea bar-
gaining.
One possibility is to inform juries of at least some of the sentence implica-
tions that arise from the different offenses on their verdict forms. This sugges-
tion is not new and is not without controversy.204 The traditional practice is to
protect the jury from learning the punishment to which the defendant is ex-
posed, ensuring that the jurors’ job is limited to determining guilt or innocence
201. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 3–4.
202. Id. at 8.
203. Recall that I assume a belief in the value of juries generally.
204. See Cahill, supra note 8; Kemmitt, supra note 15; Sauer, supra note 158, at 1233.
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regardless of the consequences of their decision.205 Courts justify this rule as
necessary to protect the jury’s role as fact finder and to prevent “open[ing] the
door to compromise verdicts.”206
But if compromise verdicts and intrajury negotiation are inevitable or at least
probable, are we not causing more harm than good by withholding this sentenc-
ing information from the jury? What can possibly justify keeping jurors in the
dark about sentencing information if they are already bargaining over the
severity of the crime of which to find the defendant guilty?207
To be sure, there are good reasons not to inform a jury of all the information
the prosecutor and defense attorney have at their disposal. A defendant’s
criminal history, for example, has much to do with his sentence, but giving this
information to a jury would likely create more problems than it solves (like
permitting the inference that if the defendant has done one bad thing he will do
another).
There are, however, more modest ways to inform jury deals. J.J Prescott and
Sonja Starr, for example, have suggested providing a jury with, “short descrip-
tions of fictional cases that exemplify the relative degree of culpability for
different members of a drug conspiracy.”208 Another possibility would be to
give the jurors a sentencing range that reflects the “going rate” for charges in
plea bargains, or at least inform the jurors of the mandatory minimum sentence
a crime carries.209 Whatever form the additional sentencing information takes,
205. The following is a representative instruction: “The punishment provided by law for the
offense[s] charged in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of the Court and should
never be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the offense[s]
charged.” 1 HON. EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 20.01 (4th ed. 1992). Most courts share a belief that this instruction is necessary to protect
the jury’s role as fact-finder. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“[P]rovid-
ing jurors sentencing information invites them [inter alia] to ponder matters that are not within their
province . . . .”); United States v. Patrick, 494 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[T]he jury’s only
function is to assess guilt or innocence on the basis of [its] view of the evidence. Sentencing
decisions . . . are within the exclusive province of court . . . .”); see also 3 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-1.1, commentary & n.4 (2d ed. 1986) (recommending abolition of jury sentenc-
ing because, inter alia, it may “undercut the integrity of its determination of the defendant’s guilt,” and
because it may prevent appropriate findings of guilt when jurors cannot agree on a sentence).
206. Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962) (“To inform the jury that the court may
impose minimum or maximum sentence, will or will not grant probation, when a defendant will be
eligible for a parole, or other matters relating to disposition of the defendant, tend to draw the attention
of the jury away from their chief function as sole judges of the facts, open the door to compromise
verdicts and to confuse the issue or issues to be decided.”).
207. See supra note 161 (research indicating that verdicts are dramatically affected by what jurors
think will happen to the defendant at sentencing).
208. Prescott & Starr, supra note 60, at 328–29. They make this recommendation based on evidence
indicating juries are not good at making decisions when given a range but no basis for comparison. Id.
209. Some argue that, particularly with respect to mandatory sentencing laws, “denying defendants
the right to inform juries of the sentencing consequences of conviction dilutes the historically and
constitutionally intended function of the criminal jury.” See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 158, at 1233; see
also Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing Jurors About Punishment
in Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 343 (1983) (arguing that the defendant has a
constitutional right to inform the jury of the sentencing consequences of mandatory sentences).
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the bottom line is that legal decision makers should possess some information about
the consequences of their decisions. This would ensure that if jurors do negotiate—
which seems difficult to prevent—they do so with accurate information. A fear
that jurors will use this information to negotiate with each other—something
they seem to be doing anyway—is an inadequate reason to keep it from them.
As for the objection that the defendant has no agent at work when a jury
negotiates, that, too, can be addressed by a fairly modest reform. It is impos-
sible, of course, to give a defendant an agent inside the jury room. But jurors
cannot compromise unless they have options before them. And, in most jurisdic-
tions, the defendant is the one with the choice to request an instruction on
lesser-included offenses.210 It would be relatively easy to require that a judge
issue an instruction to the defendant—at the point at which the defendant elects
the lesser-included offense instruction—that warns him of the risks of compro-
mise when a case with multiple verdict options goes to the jury.
Admittedly, this suggested reform seems like a very small check on the
possibility that a defendant’s fate will be determined by a negotiation he is
powerless to stop. But it is not that far off from the humble check we require in
the plea bargaining context. The validity of a plea deal turns on one factor:
whether the defendant’s decision was knowing and voluntary.211 Barring the
extreme cases, there is no digging into the fairness of the bargain, the negotiat-
ing power of the bargainers, or whether the plea complies with the “market
price” for pleas in similar cases.212 All that matters is that the defendant could
assure the court in a short boilerplate colloquy that he entered the deal know-
ingly and voluntarily. For the most part we are comfortable with that process in
the 95% of all criminal cases that plead out.213
If it is enough to ensure the voluntariness of a plea deal, a short discussion
with the judge at the point of requesting the lesser-included offense should also
be enough to guarantee that the defendant knowingly took on the risk of a
compromise verdict. This change would make his lack of an agent in those jury
210. See Orzach & Spurr, supra note 28, at 239–40.
211. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that “[t]he longstanding test for determining
the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice’” (quoting
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970))); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers
and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1026 (2006) (“[W]hile judges oversee prosecutors to make
sure that pleas are knowing and voluntary and have a factual basis, these inquiries are cursory.”
(footnotes omitted)); Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 200, at 881–85 (discussing the “voluntariness
rule” of confessions).
212. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1538–39 &
n.67 (1981) (“The Court has repeatedly held that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea entered
with the assistance of competent counsel is immune from attack no matter what other defects it may
have.”).
213. To be sure, there are many who are not comfortable with the limited review of plea bargains.
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 104, at 907 (describing various arguments in favor of heightened judicial
review). I do not disagree. My point here is, given the limited check on a defendant’s participation in
plea bargains, we should not be so concerned with the absence of his participation in intrajury
negotiation.
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discussions less of a concern. It would not eliminate all of the risks associated
with intrajury negotiation, but it would be a step in the right direction. In any
event, because the vast majority of criminal defendants agree to a plea deal with
minimal confirmation that they meaningfully participated in forming it, the
objection that compromise verdicts are illegitimate without the defendant’s
consent is less persuasive.
B. DILUTING REASONABLE DOUBT
A second objection to intrajury negotiation is that when juries disagree and
split the difference to reach a consensus they, in effect, “compromise . . . the
reasonable doubt standard.”214 The idea here is that when a jury reaches a
compromise, “each faction on the jury surrenders its honestly held beliefs on the
question of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”215
This dilution of the standard of proof creates two distinct problems: a mercy
problem and an innocence problem. If all jurors believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the most serious crime, but they compro-
mise because at least one faction of the jury thinks the crime charged is too
severe given the circumstances, this is a mercy problem. The compromise
verdict has robbed the prosecution of its rightly earned conviction.
Perhaps more troubling, however, is the innocence problem. If not all jurors
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed any of the
charged crimes—if a holdout juror, for example, thinks it is possible another
person was the culprit—then a compromise on a lesser charge to end delibera-
tion may result in conviction of the wrong person. At the very least, this
compromise erodes the protection the heightened standard of proof in criminal
cases was designed to provide. Perhaps that reason alone is enough to condemn
compromise verdicts.
But of course the innocence and mercy problems are familiar to students of
criminal law: they are the exact objections that have been launched at the plea
bargain for years. Like compromise verdicts, plea bargains reflect a discounted
standard of proof.216 Prosecutors have incentives to reduce plea prices to save
resources regardless of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, and even innocent
defendants are motivated to take the cheap deals and avoid a longer ordeal at
trial. As a result, “non-frivolous accusation—not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt—is all that is necessary to establish legal guilt” in the vast majority of
cases.217
This phenomenon drives what is perhaps the chief objection to plea bargain-
ing: innocent people do—and indeed have incentives to—plead guilty to crimes
214. Muller, supra note 7, at 796.
215. Id. at 784.
216. See Bowers, supra note 194, at 1152–53; Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining:
Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 973–74 (2007).
217. Covey, supra note 183, at 80.
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they did not commit.218 And although academics worry about the innocence
problem, it is the leniency problem—and the concern that defendants get off too
easily under plea bargaining because the convictions are all discounted from
what they should be—that dominates public opinion.219
It simply cannot be said, therefore, that because compromise verdicts dilute
the standard of proof in criminal cases, they are a fortiori unacceptable. If that
were the case, then there would be no tolerance for plea bargaining at all.
Instead, the two problematic consequences of a diluted standard of review are
already a risk (and presumably an acceptable risk) inherent in the way 95% of
criminal convictions are obtained.
Perhaps, therefore, a more specific objection is that jurors—as opposed to
prosecutors and defense attorneys—should not be permitted to compromise
the reasonable doubt standard when making their decisions. Regardless of
what professionals do, this argument goes, a criminal juror is defined by his
duty to evaluate a case beyond a reasonable doubt. Betraying that almost
sacred responsibility is a betrayal of what it means to serve as a juror in the first
place.
This argument certainly appeals to the romantic Twelve Angry Men concep-
tion of juries. But, upon further reflection, one is left to ponder an important
foundational question: what exactly is reasonable doubt? The concept anchors
our criminal justice system, but its precise definition is illusive. The Supreme
Court has held that trial courts are free to choose whether, and how, to define
reasonable doubt.220 And lower courts typically punt the question as well,
relying on the jury to figure it out.221 As one court explained, “The purposes of
having juries may be best served if juries, in the first instance, bear the
responsibility for defining reasonable doubt. Experience has shown that at-
tempts to define reasonable doubt add little in the way of clarity and often add
much in the way of confusion and controversy.”222
The question of how much doubt is reasonable is not one that is generally
answered uniformly. Several years ago, one researcher asked sitting U.S. district
judges to quantify the degree of certainty they felt constituted “beyond a
218. But see Bowers, supra note 194 (arguing that the innocence problem is not really a problem at all
because the costs of proceeding to trial often outweigh the costs of increasingly more lenient bargains).
219. Opposition to plea bargaining is not limited to academics; much of the public (both in the
United States and elsewhere) disapproves of the practice as well. But there is a major difference
between popular and academic attitudes: whereas the academics tend to dislike plea bargaining because
it treats defendants unfairly, the public tends to see the practice as treating defendants too leniently.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1909 n.4 (citations omitted).
220. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a
requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable
doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.”).
221. See United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1556–57 (D.C. Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Nolasco, 926
F.2d 869, 872–73 (9th Cir. 1991) (placing authority to define reasonable doubt within the sound
discretion of the trial court).
222. Taylor, 997 F.2d at 1558.
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reasonable doubt.”223 Their answers varied widely. Almost a third of the judges
placed beyond a reasonable doubt at 100%, a third put it at 90%, and most of
the remaining judges put it around 80%.224 Other studies indicate that percep-
tions of reasonable doubt among potential jurors are likewise varied, and can
also be disturbingly low—reflecting a level of certainty as low as 56% in some
instances.225
With a concept open to this much interpretation—even among federal judges—
how confident can we be that negotiating erodes reasonable doubt? Maybe
twelve jurors can negotiate to a deal that is consistent with a communal
understanding of reasonable doubt. If one juror is 90% sure a defendant is guilty
of first-degree murder, but another juror is 90% sure he acted without purpose
and deserves only manslaughter, a conviction in the middle does not have to
indicate that each one betrayed the reasonable doubt standard individually.
Given the confusion around the concept, it could mean that they instead applied
the standard collectively by catering to the 10% doubt and splitting the differ-
ence between them. If one person’s reasonable doubt is not the same as another
person’s reasonable doubt, then maybe a deal between them reflects the joint
application of the standard rather than its abandonment—even if they never
change their individual perceptions of the facts. If so, intrajury negotiation
does not dishonor the reasonable doubt standard—it is just another way of
employing it.
Moreover, even to the extent one retains this objection, it is another one that
can be mollified by potential reforms inspired by the plea bargaining analogy. A
hallmark of any “good” negotiation is the chance to exit.226 In plea bargaining,
a defendant and a prosecutor have this option: they can always cease negotiat-
ing and go to trial. This exit is important; it serves to prevent “bad bargains” and
unjust results. But in a jury room, there is often no real exit if the parties cannot
agree. The only potential option—a hung jury—is typically discouraged by the
judge through an Allen charge (sometimes also called a “dynamite charge”),
which exerts pressure on jurors to reach consensus.227
In the jury deliberation recorded and published by ABC, for example, the
hung jury option was seen as unavailable. After recognizing that their discus-
223. Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) (citing Rita James Simon, Judges’ Translations of
Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, in TRIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE 103 (1969)).
224. Id. Experiments on variance in conceptions of reasonable doubt has been replicated outside the
context of the federal judiciary. See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and
the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 114–15 (2002); Rita James Simon, “Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt”—An Experimental Attempt at Quantification, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 203, 207
(1970).
225. Lillquist, supra note 224, at 115.
226. See Trevor C. W. Farrow, Negotiation, Mediation, Globalization Protests and Police: Right
Processes; Wrong System, Issues, Parties and Time, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 665, 689 (2003); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 428–29 (2009).
227. Sarah Thimsen, Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller, The Dynamite Charge: Too Explosive
for Its Own Good?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 93, 95 (2009).
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sion had reached an impasse, one juror asks, “Do you want to quit?” To which a
second juror replies, “They won’t let us quit. . . . [T]hey’ll say keep working on
it. Keep working on it.”228
The recognition that juries negotiate means that we should improve the
process to make the best negotiation possible. That may mean creating—or at
least not discouraging—a way out of the negotiation so the outcome is not a
forced one with which jurors are not all comfortable.
Steps are already being taken in this direction. Responding to criticisms
that the Allen instruction unduly coerces jurors in the minority to change
their mind, the ABA has recommended a modified instruction that does not
single out the minority but instructs all jurors to “reexamine” their views. The
ABA also suggests issuing the instruction at the beginning of deliberation,
rather than waiting until the jury has trouble reaching a decision. And the
revised instruction emphasizes that the jury need not necessarily return a
verdict.229
Future reforms could go further in this direction. In recognition of intrajury
negotiation, an instruction could even partially embrace the reality of compro-
mise while making it clear that some deals are off the table. For example, jurors
could be instructed at the beginning of deliberation to seek unanimity and look
for ways to build consensus. But they could also be instructed never to
compromise their views if they believe the defendant is innocent, or that the
wrong person is accused, or whatever deals we want to exclude from their
purview.
C. LAWLESSNESS
A third objection is that jury compromises are lawless. This argument pro-
ceeds as follows: Jurors are instructed not to surrender their views on whether
the government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt; a compromise
means some jurors have done just that, and therefore, “compromise verdicts are
lawless verdicts.”230 Put differently, Eric Muller has argued that a compromise
verdict “is the quintessential coin toss.”231 Therefore, he says, acceptance of
these verdicts is too great a “sacrifice . . . that cuts to the heart of the rule of
law.”232
We have a name for lawless jury verdicts: nullification. Perhaps the ultimate
question is whether intrajury negotiation is equivalent to jury nullification.
When we speak of nullification, we generally mean “a jury’s ability to acquit a
criminal defendant despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt about
228. See In the Jury Room: Colorado v. Laura Trujillo, supra note 120.
229. Thimsen, Bornstein & Miller, supra note 227, at 119–20 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (1968)).
230. Muller, supra note 7, at 784.
231. Id. at 801.
232. Id.
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violation of a criminal statute.”233 A jury also nullifies when it convicts despite
retaining reasonable doubt (exemplified by several famous civil rights cases in
the South).234 Whatever the result, this power is widely criticized as undermin-
ing the rule of law: subjecting everyone in the criminal justice system to the
subjective preferences of twelve individuals.
To be sure, intrajury negotiation can evoke the same concerns. If a juror is
convinced a defendant’s conduct meets the elements of first-degree murder but
compromises on manslaughter for some other reason—fear of overly harsh
consequences, as a concession to a holdout juror, or simply to end deliberation
and go home—this is a deliberate choice of outcome inconsistent with jury
instructions and, perhaps, incompatible with the rule of law.
And yet intrajury negotiation seems to offer a more palatable result than
outright nullification. If there is a space between a jury’s common sense
appreciation of context—which many applaud—and jury nullification—which
many condemn—I believe intrajury negotiation falls within it. In our criminal
justice system we need protection from overinclusive or overrigid laws that
criminalize benign behavior. As others have persuasively argued, the legislature
cannot be counted on to provide that protection. A second layer of defense, if
the system worked perfectly, would mean the prosecutor is the one to protect
against overcriminalization; for he is a public servant sensitive to context—both
aggravating and mitigating factors—who, with assistance from a defense advo-
cate, can strike a balance and arrive at a fair plea deal. But, as we have seen,
there are significant reasons to distrust that story.
If those two levels of negotiation—within the legislature and between the
prosecutor and defense attorney—fail to protect against overpunishing behavior
in contradiction of common sense, the jury provides a third level of negotiation
that becomes the ultimate backstop. As discussed above, a defendant at trial
faces the brunt of overcriminalization because the charges against him have
been elevated in anticipation of a negotiation that failed. Allowing jurors to
choose among verdict options knowing they will compromise among the choices
presents a final negotiation that takes account of context and holds the line
against overcriminalization, thus mitigating the trial tax paid by defendants who
elect to go to trial.
Yes, jurors violate their instructions when they negotiate with one another,
and thus intrajury negotiation is technically an example of nullification. But I
submit it is a sort of “nullification light” and should not bear the stigma that
outright nullification carries. By negotiating, jurors are only performing a task
undertaken every day by other members of the criminal justice system. And if
they do it with the goal of arriving at the outcome that seems most fair to all of
them, I submit that it is not truly an abdication of their role as jurors.
233. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150
(1997).
234. Id. at 1191–94.
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D. ABANDONING THE QUEST FOR TRUTH
Finally, perhaps the quintessential objection to compromise verdicts is that,
by striking a compromise, jurors desert their chief task: to discover the truth. A
version of this objection was articulated in Charles Nesson’s “much-cited, if not
universally celebrated”235 article, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts.236 Nesson argues that a central goal of any
legal system is to produce “acceptable verdicts”—or “verdicts that the public
will view as statements about what actually happened.”237 According to Nesson,
a compromise verdict (in either the civil or criminal context) undermines that
objective.
To be sure, a hallmark of intrajury negotiation is that jurors stop seeking a
consensus on the facts. A compromise verdict is thus not likely to reflect a
record of what happened on the night in question. Indeed, many compromise
verdicts are inconsistent: an acquittal on one count and a conviction on another
that together do not make sense in the real world because either both events
happened or neither did.238 If part of a criminal verdict’s function is to inform
the public what actually happened and confirm “that the system is capable of
uncovering the truth,”239 then Nesson would say intrajury negotiation undercuts
that purpose and is unacceptable.
Even assuming that public trust in the criminal justice system should be a
normative goal of the system itself (an assumption that not all agree with by any
means), why must it be true that this trust is eroded when criminal law shifts
focus from truth seeking? There are many instances in which the criminal
system has abandoned the search for absolute truth in favor of other consider-
ations. In the law surrounding habeas corpus, for example, many ascribe to the
basic premise that the “truth” is “ultimately unknowable” due to the limits of
human intelligence, and thus, collateral review should be restricted to instances
of defective process.240 And the exclusionary rule, to take another example, is
now an entrenched part of American criminal adjudication despite the fact that
its very purpose restricts information and takes a toll on truth seeking.241
Plea bargaining is perhaps the most prominent example of the criminal justice
system operating collateral to a quest for truth. In a plea negotiation, neither
party is primarily concerned with what story the plea deal reflects and whether it
provides an accurate historical record; the defense attorney wants the most
235. Abramowicz, supra note 150, at 255.
236. Nesson, supra note 200, at 1358.
237. Id.
238. See Muller, supra note 7, at 773.
239. Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 200, at 908.
240. Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 358 (2010)
(discussing views expressed by Paul Bator).
241. This is not to say, of course, that the exclusionary rule is without controversy. See generally
Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct Criminal
Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241 (2010).
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lenient deal for his client and the prosecutor typically wants the toughest
conviction he can secure quickly.242 Indeed, Josh Bowers has questioned whether
even false pleas (made by innocent defendants to avoid the ordeal of trial) are
problematic. He argues that the rise of plea bargaining means “the criminal
justice system no longer has much to do with transparent adversarial truth-
seeking.”243 “Guilty pleas,” he tells us, “are thus no more than sterile administra-
tive procedures, and plea bargaining is merely the mechanism that ensures that
these procedures are carried out efficiently.”244
The bottom line is that guilty pleas proceed from a familiar premise in criminal
procedure. Either truth seeking is too expensive or too elusive or both, but, for
whatever reason, this country has long crossed over into a criminal justice
system that treats the “truth” as a version of the facts that is acceptable to all.245
If this is the case, why are we bothered by a jury discerning “truth” in the same
way? In terms of our commitment to discovering absolute truth, what difference
does it make if plea negotiators abandon it or a jury does? If all that remains is
adherence to our romantic idea of a jury discussion, that is perhaps insufficient.
CONCLUSION
Negotiation and compromise are now the name of the game in criminal
adjudication. It is a mistake to think negotiated justice does stop or should stop
with plea bargaining. Just like prosecutors and defense attorneys, jurors have
incentives to make a deal, options to create a deal, and certainly a variety of
views to accommodate before finishing their job.
We should not treat their compromises as flukes or flaws. Given our general
acceptance of negotiation to resolve criminal cases, the rejection of jury negotia-
tions does not make sense. To be sure, intrajury negotiation can be improved,
but it is not illegitimate just because it results in a deal. Deals are rampant in our
criminal justice system, and by and large, we accept them as inevitable and seek
to improve them. The same strategic shift should be made for compromise
verdicts. Rather than dismissing intrajury negotiation as illegitimate, we should
acknowledge it as a reality, recognize its resemblance to plea bargaining, and
then seek to improve it in light of that analogy.
242. The motivations of a prosecutor, to be sure, vary by prosecutor and by case. Some seek to
maximize sentences; others to maximize number of convictions; others to ensure that the charge
brought is the most just. See Bowers, supra note 194, at 1139. My point is only that rarely are
prosecutors concerned with whether the plea deal accurately reflects the crime story. See Stephanos
Bibas & William K. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Real-
ism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 687 (2010) (arguing that charge bargaining is the worst form of plea bargaining
precisely because it “distorts the historical record and lies to the public about what actually happened”).
243. Bowers, supra note 194, at 1173.
244. Id.
245. Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspective, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 157, 158–60 (2003).
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